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 Abstract 
The past decade has seen intense academic debates over possible explanations 
for the different systems of corporate ownership and control that exist in 
developed economies. Yet the role of bankruptcy as a mechanism of corporate 
governance has received relatively little attention. Furthermore, many theories 
have failed to account successfully for events occurring in the UK, 
notwithstanding its similarity to the US. In response, this paper offers an 
account of the complementarities between bankruptcy law and ownership 
structure, which it is argued can explain developments in both the UK and the 
US. By identifying the effects of concentration or dispersion in firms’ capital 
structure (across both equity and debt), and by analysing implications of these 
capital structure choices for bankruptcy, the paper develops a richer account of 
the corporate governance patterns we see in different nations. 
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The corporate world today subdivides into rival systems of dispersed 
and concentrated ownership, with different corporate governance 
structures characterizing each (Coffee, 1999a). The United States 
falls into the former category and major industrial rivals such as 
Japan and Germany are members of the latter. The past decade has 
seen intense academic debates over possible explanations for the 
different systems of ownership and control in key developed 
economies. Anecdotal evidence which suggests that market forces 
may be serving to destabilize traditional business structures and 
foster some form of convergence in a US direction has given the 
controversy powerful current relevance.   
For those seeking to account for the existence of rival systems of 
dispersed and concentrated ownership, the United Kingdom has 
proved to be something of a “problem child”.  Britain provides the 
United States with a companion in the dispersed ownership category 
since, as is the case in the US, publicly quoted companies are a 
pivotal feature of the corporate economy and large business 
enterprises typically have diffuse ownership structures.  Given the 
similarities between the two countries, a logical way to test the 
various theories that have been offered to account for the 
configuration of America’s system of ownership and control is to see 
whether they have explanatory power in a British context. When this 
has been done, however, events occurring in the UK have tended to 
cast doubt upon rather than lend support to the relevant hypothesis.  
This has been the case, for instance, with theories concerning 
financial services regulation, political ideology and minority 
shareholder protection.   
The purpose of this Article is to refer again to the British experience 
to test an additional hypothesis that has been offered to explain why 
the corporate economy in the US is organized differently than it is in 
countries such as Germany and Japan. Corporate bankruptcy, it has 
  1been said, is the “crucial missing piece in understanding corporate 
governance”. According to this thesis, an “evolutionary” account of 
corporate governance, a country’s system of bankruptcy law is either 
“manager-driven” or “manager-displacing”, with the former offering 
executives of a financially troubled firm substantial scope to launch a 
rescue effort and the latter having a strong bias in favour of 
liquidation. The thinking, in very basic terms, is that a manager-
driven bankruptcy regime is complementary to dispersed share 
ownership and its manager-displacing counterpart aligns with a 
governance regime where concentrated ownership prevails. Given 
the configuration of the UK’s system of ownership and control, this 
would imply that Britain should have a manager-driven bankruptcy 
system. As we will see, though, the country’s bankruptcy laws 
strongly protect lenders and few public companies that end up in 
formal bankruptcy proceedings escape liquidation.  
How is it possible to reconcile Britain’s diffuse share ownership 
structure with a bankruptcy regime that has strong manager-
displacing features? Three possibilities come to mind. First, the UK’s 
system of ownership and control may function in a manner different 
than the received wisdom implies. Second, Britain’s bankruptcy 
regime may operate in a manager-driven fashion despite the apparent 
bias in favour of liquidation. Third, the relationship between 
bankruptcy and corporate governance might need to be rethought in 
light of the British experience. This paper examines each of these 
possibilities and ultimately argues that the third option is the correct 
one. It will be seen, however, that modifying the thesis that there is a 
strong link between a country’s bankruptcy regime and the 
configuration of its corporate economy allows us to develop a more 
powerful explanation of corporate governance systems that has 
important implications for both policy and future research.  
The key addition to the theory is a more complete analysis of debt in 
the overall corporate governance framework. Like equity, the focus 
of most of the existing debate, debt finance can be either 
  2concentrated (as when firms borrow from one or a syndicate of 
banks) or dispersed (as when they issue public debt). By identifying 
the effects of concentration or dispersion in firms’ equity and debt 
finance, and the implications of these capital structure choices for 
bankruptcy, the Article develops a richer account of the corporate 
governance patterns we see in different nations. 
The Article is organized as follows. Section I begins by providing a 
brief overview of the world’s rival systems of ownership and control.  
Section II identifies and elaborates on the UK’s status as a theoretical 
“problem child” by analysing efforts that have been made to explain 
corporate governance arrangements by way of financial services 
regulation, political ideology and minority shareholder protection.   
The third section of the Article then offers a synopsis of the thesis 
that corporate bankruptcy is the “crucial missing piece in 
understanding corporate governance”. Section IV provides an 
overview of Britain’s bankruptcy regime. This overview, which 
demonstrates that Britain’s approach is manager-displacing, rather 
than manager-driven as the evolutionary theory would predict, shows 
that the UK lives up to its “problem child” status in the bankruptcy 
context as well as various others.   
Section V scrutinizes the received wisdom concerning Britain’s 
system of ownership and control  to see if, in practice, managers and 
investors conduct themselves in the manner that would be expected 
where share ownership is widely dispersed. The section concludes 
that they do, and thus that UK corporate governance has not been 
mischaracterized by the existing literature. The sixth section of the 
paper assesses whether it is appropriate to think of the UK as a 
manager-displacing bankruptcy regime, given that financially 
troubled large companies can carry out workouts pursuant to 
informal guidelines known as the “London Approach.” The 
prominence of the London Approach suggests that the UK approach 
to corporate insolvency is less manager-displacing in practice than 
  3the formal rules would suggest, but it does not fully solve the UK 
governance puzzle. 
To provide a more satisfying account of the British situation, we 
must reconfigure the hypothesis that there is a fundamental link 
between corporate governance and bankruptcy. Section VII 
undertakes this task. It is here that we emphasize the role of debt 
finance, and its interaction with stock ownership and the relevant 
insolvency framework. By taking these “below the line” factors fully 
into account, rather than focusing solely on the ownership and 
control of firms’ stock, the Article seeks to provide a better 
explanation of UK governance, as well as a richer account of the 
factors that distinction different corporate governance approaches.   
Section VIII then applies the reconfigured evolutionary theory to 
closely held corporations in the US and UK.  Section IX is a brief 
conclusion. 
 
I. Rival Corporate Governance Systems 
As mentioned, share ownership in the US and the UK is generally 
characterized as being widely dispersed. This proposition deserves 
further elaboration. Almost all of America’s largest corporations are 
quoted on the stock market, as are most major British companies 
(Moerland, 1995; Franks and Mayer, 1997).  Moreover, with firms 
that are publicly quoted, voting control is typically not concentrated 
in the hands of families, banks or other firms. In Britain, fewer than 3 
out of 10 of the country’s publicly quoted companies have a 
shareholder that owns more than one-fifth of the shares (Faccio and 
Lang, 2000). Likewise, in major US companies large shareholdings, 
and especially majority ownership, are the exception rather than the 
rule (La Porta et al, 1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
The structure of ownership and control which exists in the UK and 
the US has been characterized as an “outsider/arm’s-length” system 
  4(Berglöf, 1997a; Goergen, 1998).
1  The “outsider” typology is used 
to describe the situation that exists because share ownership is 
dispersed among a large number of institutional and individual 
investors rather than being concentrated in the hands of “core” 
shareholders capable of exercising “inside” influence. The term 
“arm’s-length” signifies the received wisdom that investors in the US 
and Britain are rarely poised to intervene and take a hand in running 
a business. Instead, they tend to maintain their distance and give 
executives a free hand to manage.
2  
Matters are organized quite differently in continental Europe and in 
market-oriented economies in Asia. Publicly quoted companies do 
not play as nearly as important a role in the economy as they do in 
the US and the UK (La Porta et al, 1997). Also, with those firms that 
are publicly traded, “core” shareholders are prevalent and are usually 
well-situated to exercise considerable influence over management. 
Corporate governance therefore is “insider/control-oriented” 
(Berglöf, 1997a; Hoshi, 1998).   
Commentators have frequently pointed to banks as an additional key 
distinction between countries in the “outsider/arm’s length” category 
and their “insider/control-oriented” counterparts.
3 The conventional 
wisdom is that in the US and the UK there is little interdependence 
between banks and larger industrial or commercial firms (see 
Charkham, 1994; Scott, 1997). This is logical enough since these are 
countries where the stock market is said to be the key allocator of 
capital (Economist, 2001a; cf. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999).   
In insider/control-oriented jurisdictions, by contrast, the market 
capitalisation of the stock market constitutes a small percentage of 
GDP as compared with the US and the UK (La Porta et al, 1997; 
Wymeersch, 1997). By default, banking institutions should be at the 
forefront with respect to corporate finance.
4 Similarly, banks stand as 
leading candidates to exercise “inside” influence with respect to 
individual companies (Cunningham, 1999). Consistent with what 
  5might be expected in Japan, Germany and certain other continental 
European countries banks have developed and retained over time 
strong links with major industrial and commercial enterprises 
(Moerland, 1995; Scott, 1997). For instance, a German “universal 
bank” that lends money to a major corporate customer will also quite 
often act as a financial adviser to the borrower, own a block of shares 
in the company and act as a proxy for other investors at shareholder 
meetings (Charkham, 1994; Hopt, 2000). In Japan, it is common for 
an individual company to have an ongoing relationship with “main 
bank” where the bank owns a block of shares, supplies management 
resources and provides various financial services (Charkham, 1994; 
OECD, 1996).   
In both Germany and Japan, during good times corporate managers 
are allowed ample latitude by banks since monitoring tends to be 
relaxed and informal. For instance, it has been said that a big German 
bank will act as an “owner, adviser, financier and benevolent uncle” 
(Barber, 1999; Hanazaki and Horiuchi, 2000). Things, however, are 
said to change if a company is performing poorly. The received 
wisdom is that, under such circumstances, control rights are swiftly 
transferred to the bank that is acting as the primary lender which then 
takes orchestrates an informal restructuring, an advantageous merger 
or an orderly liquidation (Charkham, 1994; Hanazaki and Horiuchi, 
2000).  
In order to serve as an effective monitor, a “main” bank must have 
enough leverage over the debtor to implement change if the firm’s 
managers misbehave or the firm performs poorly. Since German and 
Japanese banks often own shares in their major corporate customers, 
voting rights offer one source of influence. Nevertheless, in both 
countries control of credit has been their primary means by which 
banking institutions have exerted influence (Charkham, 1994; 
Prowse, 1995; Skeel, 1998). While larger business enterprises that 
have a close relationship with a bank can achieve considerable 
autonomy by financing operations through retained earnings,
5 a 
  6German or Japanese company operating under difficult financial 
conditions typically has had little choice but to respond to a bank’s 
interventions in the event of a crisis. This is because of a lack of 
alternative sources of finance. Again, equity markets in the two 
countries are also comparatively underdeveloped. Also, while in the 
United States larger corporations quite often issue publicly traded 
debt to raise fresh capital, this has traditionally not been the case in 
either Germany or Japan (Charkham, 1994: 99; Prigge, 1997: 1016-
17; Corbett and Jenkinson, 1997; Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999: 1).      
There has been extensive debate on the relative merits of a “bank-
based” financial system as compared with its “market-based” 
counterpart (Levine, 2000). Nevertheless, it should not be taken for 
granted that banks are as pivotal as this intense dialogue implies.
6 
Instead, classifying financial systems on the basis of whether they are 
“bank-based” or not is an exercise fraught with difficulties (La Porta 
et al, 2000). For instance, the role of the stock market in the US and 
the UK should not be unduly exaggerated. According to aggregate 
financial data, in these two “market-oriented” countries, debt is a 
more important source of corporate funding than is the issuance of 
shares (Prowse, 1995: Berglöf, 1997a).   
Another reason that it can be unhelpful to focus unduly on banks 
when categorizing financial systems is that it cannot be taken for 
granted that, in a country with weak securities markets and 
concentrated share ownership, there will be substantial 
interdependence between banks and larger industrial or commercial 
firms. To illustrate, while Italy is an “insider/control-oriented” 
jurisdiction, the country’s banks are not closely involved in corporate 
governance (La Porta et al, 2000; Melis, 2000; Carpenter and Rondi, 
2000; Volpin, 2001). Even with Germany, often cited as the 
prototypical example of a bank-oriented financial system,
7 there is 
evidence to suggest that the influence of the banks has been 
exaggerated (Edwards and Fischer, 1994; Corbett and Jenkinson, 
1997; Guianne, 2001).
8   
  7Moreover, no matter how powerful leading banks might have been in 
the past in individual insider-oriented countries, their influence is 
diminishing. For larger business enterprises, publicly traded debt is 
playing an increasingly supplemental role to commercial bank 
lending, at least in Europe (McLaughlin, 2001). Also, banking 
institutions themselves are reconfiguring themselves in response to 
myriad financial pressures, with the result being that they are often 
content to abandon their “benevolent uncle” role (James, 2001).  
In short, it is important to recognize that “insider governance” does 
not necessarily mean “bank governance.” Although bank and other 
financial institutions are sometimes the principal shareholders in an 
insider system, family members and other individuals play a much 
more important role in many nations.    
In recent years, there also have been increasing questions as to 
whether the distinction between outsider/arm’s length and insiders 
systems will endure. Anecdotal evidence accumulating prior to the 
fall in global equity markets in 2001 suggested that in continental 
Europe and in market-oriented economies in East Asia some form of 
convergence was occurring along Anglo-American lines. Frequent 
initial public offerings (IPOs) meant the number of listed companies 
was growing rapidly in continental Europe (Van der Elst, 2000; 
Coffee, 2001). Similarly, Japan’s IPO market was booming 
(Abrahams, 2000). Also, firms that had already issued shares to the 
public were actively seeking out broader markets for their equity, 
quite often by obtaining listings on US stock exchanges (Pagano et 
al, 1999; Hertig, 2000; Guha and Merchant, 2000).  Furthermore, in 
insider/control-oriented countries those owning large blocks of 
equity in publicly quoted companies appeared to be unwinding their 
holdings to some degree (Coffee, 2001; Rhoads and Fuhrmans, 
2001). At the same time, share ownership was becoming more 
popular on a societal level as the number of individuals owning 
equity directly or via collective investment vehicles (e.g. mutual 
funds) was growing significantly (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001: 
  8452).  For instance, in Europe’s eight largest countries, the number of 
people owning shares was forecast to rise from 35.6 million in 1999 
to 53.1 million in 2003 (Targett, 2001).   
The recent fall in global equity markets has led to, at the very least, a 
pause in the convergence trend.  Global equity issuance, for instance, 
has declined significantly. Also, the pace at which concentrated 
shareholdings are being unwound might be slowing. Moreover, the 
stock market drop has sorely tested enthusiasm for shares in those 
countries where an incipient “equity culture” was emerging 
(Economist, 2001a; 2001b). Still, it seems premature, on the strength 
of what might be nothing more than a cyclical downturn, to declare 
the end of “the age of equity”. As a result, convergence along Anglo-
American lines could still be very much on the cards.    
 
II. The Foundations Of Corporate Governance:  The UK as a 
“Problem Child” 
A. Explaining Why Corporate Governance Arrangements Differ 
In “the single most influential book ever written about 
corporations”,
9 Berle and Means (1932) drew attention to the 
outsider/arms-length pattern of corporate governance that currently 
prevails in the US. They said there was “a separation of ownership 
and control” in America’s larger public companies since share 
ownership was too widely dispersed to permit investors to scrutinize 
properly managerial decision-making. The normative implications of 
this “separation of ownership and control” were keenly debated in 
the decades following the publication of Berle and Means book (see 
Mark, 1995; Gilson, 1996; Rock, 1996). Nevertheless, interested 
observers implicitly agreed on an important point:  fragmented share 
ownership was inevitable in major business enterprises. 
  9According to the prevailing orthodoxy, technology dictated that 
dominant firms must be large (Roe, 1994). Dispersed ownership 
followed because the capital needs of big companies were so great 
that a handful of wealthy individuals could not provide proper 
financial backing. Also, a separation of ownership and control was 
beneficial since executives were hired on the basis of their 
managerial credentials, not their ability to finance the firm or family 
connections with dominant shareholders. Therefore, the American 
version of the public corporation was the logical winner of a 
Darwinian struggle between different forms of corporate structure.  
So long as the US public corporation was accepted as the 
evolutionary pinnacle, other systems with different institutional 
characteristics could be safely ignored: “neither laggards nor 
neanderthals (compel) significant academic attention” (Albert, 1993: 
128). During the 1980s and early 1990s, however, Germany and 
Japan seemed to be enjoying greater economic success than the US 
(see Lipton and Rosenblum, 1991; Albert, 1993). This implied, 
contrary to the received wisdom concerning the “Berle-Means 
corporation”,
10 that a different ownership and control framework was 
fully capable of delivering similar or even superior results (Gilson, 
1996: 332). The possibility that there might be several equally 
efficient ways to organize large-scale industry raised, in turn, a 
question:  why did the US system of corporate governance evolve in 
a manner different from its counterparts in Germany and Japan? 
(Roe, 1993). 
As the 1990s began, the economic context changed but did so in a 
way that ensured that this question concerning the essential 
foundations of corporate governance systems remained topical.   
Throughout the decade, the United States enjoyed faster economic 
growth and lower unemployment than its chief economic rivals 
(Economist, 1999).  America’s success in the capitalist “beauty 
contest” served, in turn, to cast doubt on the superiority of the 
German and Japanese approaches to corporate governance and 
  10suggested that the Berle-Means corporation was delivering the 
efficiencies that economic theory implies it should. The fact that 
countries with insider/control-oriented systems of ownership and 
control were experiencing some form of convergence along 
American lines did much the same since the process could be 
characterized as an evolutionary drive toward efficient structures 
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001).   
Since economic trends seemed to be demonstrating the relative 
efficiency of the US economic model, speculation grew as to why the 
apparently inferior insider/control-oriented system of corporate 
governance had persisted in so many countries (e.g. Wessel, 2001). 
One reason the issue attracted attention was a growing belief that it 
might be beneficial to create conditions that would accelerate a 
switch towards the American version of capitalism (Vives (ed.), 
2000: 84-85; Economist, 2001a). This meant, in turn, that it was 
necessary to understand the recipe for US corporate success. Hence, 
while America’s economic surge changed the context, it remained 
pertinent to contemplate why the US system of corporate governance 
had evolved in a manner different from its counterparts in Germany 
and Japan.    
Mark Roe has, in a wide range of published work, sought to explain 
why the corporate governance arrangements that prevail in the 
United States are not universal. A key theme in his writing is that a 
deeply ingrained popular mistrust of concentrated financial power in 
the US contributed significantly to the dominance of the Berle-
Means corporation (Roe, 1990; 1994; 1997). Roe has argued that, at 
several points in the 20
th century, large financial institutions were 
poised to take substantial block positions in American business firms 
and adopt an activist approach to corporate governance. On these 
occasions, however, politicians intervened, forced corporate 
ownership to remain fragmented and deterred big financial 
institutions from taking a close interest in the activities of corporate 
executives. The Berle-Means corporation, then, was not a necessity. 
  11It was an adaptation that arose to fit the kind of financial system US 
history produced.   
Roe has also drawn attention to an additional political contingency 
that may have had an influence on corporate governance patterns.  
He says there is a statistical correlation between a country’s position 
on the ideological spectrum and its corporate ownership structure.  
According to his findings, “left-wing” social democracies have fewer 
publicly quoted firms and significantly higher levels of ownership 
concentration than “right-wing” countries where there is little or no 
tradition of social democracy (Roe, 2000).   
Roe’s explanation for the correlation he has found is that social 
democracies favour employees over investors and correspondingly 
use regulation to increase the leverage workers possess (Roe, 2000). 
Under these conditions, he argues, corporate executives will tend to 
cater to employee preferences and give shareholders short shrift. This 
bias will exacerbate underlying conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders, thereby increasing substantially the 
disadvantages associated with investing in a widely held public 
company. The upshot, according to Roe, is that the ownership format 
characteristic of the Berle-Means corporation is less likely to emerge 
in a social democracy than it is in a country without a strong socialist 
tradition, such as the United States.  
Roe has not had a monopoly over discussion of the essential 
foundations of corporate governance arrangements in the United 
States and elsewhere.  An alternate explanation for differences which 
exist that has quickly gained adherents is that the “law matters”.
11  To 
elaborate, various economists and academic lawyers have 
hypothesized that corporate governance has not evolved along 
Anglo-American lines in other countries because the appropriate 
corporate law regime was not in place (e.g. Coffee, 1999b; Scott, 
1999; La Porta et al, 2000; Johnson et al, 2000).    
  12The essential insight which underlies the “law matters” thesis is that, 
in an unregulated environment, there is a real danger that a public 
company’s “insiders” (controlling shareholders and senior 
executives)
12 will cheat outside investors who own equity.   
According to the “law matters” story, minority shareholders feel 
“comfortable” in a “protective” environment where the legal system 
regulates quite closely opportunistic conduct by insiders.
13 Such 
confidence means that investors are willing to pay full value for 
shares made available for sale, which in turn lowers the cost of 
capital for firms that choose to sell equity in financial markets.   
Public offerings of shares can easily follow.  Moreover, most 
controlling shareholders will be content to unwind their holdings 
since the law will largely preclude them from exploiting their 
position. The conditions therefore are well-suited for a widely 
dispersed pattern of share ownership (Coffee, 1999b; Black, 2000). 
In a country where the law offers little protection against cheating by 
insiders, the outcome seemingly must be different (Scott, 1999; 
Johnson and Shleifer, 1999; Black, 2000). Potential investors, fearing 
exploitation, will steer clear of the stock market.  Insiders, being 
aware of the adverse sentiment, will opt to retain the private benefits 
of control and rely on different sources of finance.   
A series of empirical studies indicates that corporate law might 
matter in just the way that has been hypothesized (Coffee, 1999b). 
The research suggests that the degree of protection a country’s legal 
system provides for outside investors has a significant effect on its 
corporate governance regime. Stronger legal protection for minority 
shareholders is associated with a larger number of listed companies, 
more valuable stock markets, lower private benefits of control and a 
lower concentration of ownership and control.
14  These results imply 
that the Berle-Means corporation is unlikely to become dominant in 
countries that do not offer significant legal protection to outside 
investors.  
  13B. Britain 
Each of the various explanations that have been offered to account 
for the existence of divergent corporate governance regimes 
potentially accounts for developments occurring in the US.  Roe 
developed his financial services regulation thesis specifically to 
address the American situation (Roe, 1994: vii). Moreover, in 
presenting his analysis of social democracy, he has reminded readers 
that while he might discuss other countries in some detail, he is in 
fact writing largely about the United States (Roe, 2000: 600).   
Moreover, consistent with the “law matters” hypothesis, the US has 
both dispersed share ownership and a legal system that regulates 
quite closely opportunistic conduct by insiders (e.g. Coffee, 1999b).
15  
As discussed in section I, the UK, like the US, has an “outsider/arm’s 
length” system of ownership and control. The two countries have 
other features in common.  For instance, they have a shared legal 
heritage encompassing the common law and principles of equity 
(DeMott, 1999). Moreover, Britain and the US both have a 
“shareholder economy” where private enterprise is about maximizing 
profits for those who invest and shareholders occupy the central 
position with respect to companies (Cunningham, 1999; Bolkestein, 
1999).
16  In contrast, continental European countries and Japan have 
a “stakeholder economy” where there is a desire to strike a balance 
between various constituencies linked with companies and where 
sustainable, stable and continuous economic growth, not profit 
maximization, is the over-riding priority (Bolkestein, 1999; Allen 
and Gale, 2000a; Roe, 2001a).   
Admittedly, the corporate economy is not organised in precisely the 
same fashion in the US and UK. Indeed, we will focus in sections V 
and VII respectively on two potentially significant distinctions, these 
being Britain’s more concentrated share ownership structure and its 
comparatively underdeveloped market for corporate debt. Still, since 
the US and the UK have so much in common, ascertaining how 
  14matters developed in Britain is a good way to test the various theories 
that have been advanced to explain why the Berle-Means corporation 
is dominant in the US but not in various other major industrialised 
countries (Black and Coffee, 1994; Cheffins, 2001a). As we shall 
see, with each hypothesis we have considered thus far, the British 
experience casts doubt on their explanatory power. Hence, for those 
seeking to account for why an outsider/arm’s length system of 
ownership and control prevails in some countries and an 
insider/control-oriented regime exists in others, the UK is something 
of a “problem child”.   
Consider, for instance, Mark Roe’s thesis that financial services 
regulation is important.
17 He has relied, in part, on developments in 
the American banking industry to support his argument that the 
Berle-Means corporation was an adaptation that arose to fit the kind 
of financial system US history produced rather than a product of 
market forces. He adopts the received wisdom on banks, saying that, 
while they developed and retained strong links with major industrial 
and commercial enterprises in Germany and Japan, they maintained 
their distance in the US (Roe, 1994). Roe has argued that in the case 
of the United States government regulations dictated the outcome 
since federal laws put a fault line between banking and other sectors 
of the economy.
18 
In Britain, like the US, banking institutions typically adopted 
straightforward “arm’s-length” lending arrangements with their 
customers and did not seek to cement relations by owning shares in 
their borrowers (Thomas, 1978; Capie and Collins, 1992; Black and 
Coffee, 1994).  Given what Roe has said, one would expect that in 
the UK there would have been laws in place that discouraged banks 
from stepping forward. In fact, however, the UK’s commercial 
deposit-taking or “clearing” banks were never confronted with 
explicit restrictions on the activities they could undertake (Jacobs, 
1923: 579; Bose, 1993; Allen and Gale, 2000b).
19 Instead, influenced 
by a strong bias in favour of liquidity, top banking personnel chose to 
  15avoid offering long-term financial commitments to corporate 
borrowers and dismissed the ownership of shares as an option on 
grounds of poor marketability and high risk (Capie and Collins, 
1992; Fohlin, 1999b). The experience with UK banks 
correspondingly is inconsistent with Roe’s thesis that a country’s 
approach to financial services regulation will help to dictate whether 
the Berle-Means corporation becomes dominant.
20   
Turning from Roe’s analysis of financial services regulation to his 
social democracy thesis, the experience in the United Kingdom again 
casts doubt on the arguments he has advanced.
21  Roe defines a social 
democracy as a nation with a government that is deeply concerned 
about distributional issues, favours employees over investors and 
plays a large role in the economy (Roe, 2000: 543). According to 
such criteria, the UK likely qualified as a social democracy from the 
end of World War II until Margaret Thatcher’s rise to power in 1979 
(Cheffins, 2002a). Still, despite this left-wing bias, there is evidence 
indicating that the UK’s system of ownership and control was 
evolving towards the US model during the decades prior to 
Thatcher’s election.  Indeed, while the Berle-Means corporation was 
certainly not dominant in the UK before World War II, it may well 
have been by 1980 (Cheffins, 2002b).   
In order to account for the British experience and bring it into line 
with his social democracy thesis, Roe has sought to argue that 
“neither stock markets nor ownership grew much” between 1945 and 
1979 (Roe, 2002). There is plenty of secondary evidence which casts 
doubt on this “deep freeze” account of events.  According to an 
historical survey of British industrial entrepreneurship and 
management published in 1978, “(i)n the post-1945 period there has 
been considerable discussion of the democratization of company 
holdings (and)…this increasing democratization has clearly involved 
increasing separation of ownership and control.” (Payne, 1978: 221) 
A distinguished British business historian subsequently offered a 
similar verdict, saying that  
  16“…in the postwar world the structure of British business changed 
radically. Family firms and family directors progressively 
disappeared off the corporate scene. By 1970 it would make little 
sense to talk of British personal capitalism.” (Jones, 1997: 118)   
Still, regardless of precisely what happened in the UK between 1945 
and 1979, Roe has conceded that “(t)he United Kingdom would seem 
the hardest case for political theory” (Roe, 2002). He has therefore 
endorsed the notion that Britain is something of a “problem child” 
for his ideological account of corporate governance arrangements.  
Roe, as well as acknowledging that events in Britain cause some 
difficulties for his social democracy thesis, has pointed out that “the 
UK also seems to fit badly with a law-driven theory” (Roe, 2002). 
Why is this the case? Again, the “law matters” thesis implies that a 
country has the potential to develop a vibrant stock market and a 
widely dispersed pattern of share ownership if its legal system 
closely regulates cheating and other opportunistic conduct by 
corporate “insiders”. If law in fact is a pivotal factor, then the UK’s 
legal regime should have favoured minority shareholders against 
corporate “insiders” as the country’s outsider/arm’s-length system of 
ownership and control was taking shape. The historical evidence, 
however, suggests this did not occur. 
The publicly quoted company first became a well-established part of 
the British economy in the early years of the 20
th century. At this 
point, however, it was standard for a business traded on the stock 
market to have the entrepreneurs who founded the firm and their 
heirs as “core” shareholders (Cheffins, 2001b; 2002b). This share 
ownership pattern ultimately unwound sufficiently for a separation of 
ownership and control to emerge, though the Berle-Means 
corporation did not become dominant in Britain until at least the 
1950s and perhaps as late as the 1970s or early 1980s (Cheffins, 
2001; 2002b). Throughout the relevant period, UK company law, by 
and large, offered minority shareholders little protection against 
  17opportunism by insiders. Admittedly, the regulation of UK financial 
markets was toughened considerably in the mid-1980s.
22 The 
country’s current share ownership pattern was in place, however, by 
this time (Cheffins, 2001b). The upshot is that the Berle-Means 
corporation became dominant when lawmakers were not doing a 
great deal to ensure that those buying shares in publicly quoted 
companies would feel “comfortable”. 
While the legal system did not afford much explicit protection to 
minority shareholders as a separation of ownership and control was 
becoming entrenched in the UK, this did not mean that investors 
were left completely at the mercy of market forces. For instance, 
particularly during the first half of the 20
th century, British 
companies sought to cultivate a loyal constituency of investors by 
offering regular and steady dividend payments (Samuel, 1933; 
Baskin and Miranti, 1997).
23 Moreover, from at least the 1920s 
onwards, the financial professionals who organized public offerings 
of shares in the UK were sufficiently motivated by reputational 
concerns to carry out significant “quality control” (Cheffins, 2001b).  
Finally, the London Stock Exchange, functioning without direct 
support from government, scrutinized offerings of shares before 
trading commenced and tailored its listing rules to deal with various 
matters of potential concern to outside investors (e.g. disclosure, pre-
emptive rights, insider trading and other forms of self-dealing by 
directors and controlling shareholders) (ibid).   
The upshot, as at least one leading advocate of the “law matters” 
thesis has explicitly acknowledged, is that events occurring in Britain 
illustrate that strong corporate laws may not have to be in place for 
widely dispersed share ownership to evolve (Coffee, 2001b).
24 
Instead, the British experience indicates that institutional alternatives 
to corporate law can foster sufficient confidence on the part of 
investors to permit an outsider/arm’s-length regime to take shape.
25 
Hence, as is the case with Roe’s explanations for the existence of 
divergent corporate governance regimes, events in Britain cast doubt 
  18on the hypothesis that a country’s company law has a pivotal effect 
on the configuration of its corporate economy.  
 
III. The Complementarity of Bankruptcy Regulation, Corporate 
Law and Corporate Governance 
A. Debt as the Missing Piece of Corporate Governance Puzzle 
One feature that links the various theories we have considered thus 
far is an equity bias. The primary question which each seeks to 
address is:  why do share ownership patterns differ? To be sure, 
bank-oriented finance has attracted attention but this has been 
because it has been treated as the logical corollary of underdeveloped 
equity markets. The analytical bias in favour of shares means that in 
the comparative corporate governance literature, a potentially 
important piece of the puzzle is missing:  a systematic appraisal of 
corporate borrowing. In other words, what might be happening 
“below the line” has been ignored at the expense of the configuration 
“above the line”. This bias, it should be said, is not restricted to the 
cross-border analysis of financial systems. Instead, on a more general 
level, the typical model of corporate governance views issues 
through the lens of equity interests (Triantis and Daniels, 1995).
26     
The analytical bias in favour of share ownership patterns seems odd 
when aggregate patterns of corporate finance are taken into account.  
The available data indicates that in major industrialised nations debt 
is a more important source of corporate funding than is the issuance 
of shares (Corbett and Jenkinson, 1997). As we have seen, this is 
even the case with the US and the UK, despite the fact that both have 
a “shareholder economy”.  
Regardless of the precise balance between equity and debt as a 
source of finance, ignoring the role of corporate borrowing is 
potentially misguided because corporate governance can be 
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creditors. Often, the interests of these two constituencies will be 
congruent. For instance, a lender’s monitoring of a corporate 
borrower can benefit shareholders since the disciplinary aspect will 
help to constrain managerial misconduct. Moreover, a lender’s strong 
reaction to changing circumstances can provide signals for those 
owning equity to intervene (Triantis and Daniels, 1995).   
The relationship between debt and equity can, however, also have its 
frictions. Consider, for instance, what can be termed the “agency 
costs of debt”. These arise because managers may take actions that 
are calculated to benefit shareholders at the expense of creditors. An 
example is where a corporation takes on a substantial debt load, 
thereby increasing the risk of default, in order to finance high-risk 
ventures with a potentially lucrative “upside” (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).   
Conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors can also run 
in the opposite direction. Take the case of a corporation that obtains 
finance primarily from one lender. Management may, in response to 
an implicit threat of exit, implement decisions benefiting that party at 
the expense of shareholders (Triantis and Daniels, 1995: 1096-1103). 
Biasing the borrower’s investment decisions in favour of projects 
with low risk would be one example of this type of “creditor rent 
extraction” (Buckley, 1992: 255; Morck and Nakamara, 2000). 
Others would include arranging fresh borrowing on terms highly 
favourable to the lender and charging excessive fees for the supply of 
additional services (e.g. management consulting or underwriting) 
(Mayer, 1998; Gorton and Schmid, 2000). 
It should now be evident that a fully developed account of the 
configuration of the corporate economy in major industrialised 
nations needs to have due regard for what occurs “below the line”.  
One of us, in previous work, has in fact made this point and sought to 
add debt to the comparative corporate governance equation (Skeel, 
  201998). This was done by way of an “evolutionary theory” that 
posited a strong complementarity between a country’s financial 
system and its bankruptcy law.
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We have just seen that Britain constitutes something of “problem 
child” for various explanations that have been offered to account for 
corporate governance structures in various countries. It transpires 
that the UK also causes some difficulties for the evolutionary theory 
as well.  Still, the British experience does not displace the possibility 
that there is an integral link between bankruptcy rules and share 
ownership patterns. To understand the logic involved, it is necessary 
to be familiar with the intuition underlying the evolutionary theory.  
A summary follows, together with a description of how the theory 
applies in relation to “family capitalism”. 
   
B. The Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Bankruptcy:  A Précis 
For the purposes of the evolutionary theory, national bankruptcy 
regimes can be divided into two categories. These are “manager-
driven”, where those in charge of a financially troubled firm have 
substantial scope to launch a rescue effort and “manager-displacing”, 
where there is a strong bias in favour of liquidation. The intuition 
which underlies the evolutionary theory is that corporate executives 
are aware of the bankruptcy law they face and adjust their behaviour 
accordingly. At the same time, though, the way managers conduct 
themselves may help to dictate how a country’s bankruptcy system is 
configured. By virtue of this sort of feedback loop, the result should 
be a complementary relationship between a country’s system of 
ownership and control on the one hand and its regulation of corporate 
financial distress on the other.  
To appreciate the connections, let us start with arrangements in the 
United States. As we have seen, the US has an outsider/arm’s-length 
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in, at most, only intermittent oversight of the managers of a publicly 
quoted company. Corporate executives do not, however, have 
untrammelled discretion to do as they please. Instead, various factors 
make managers fearful of poor share price performance and give 
them incentives to boost earnings.
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One consideration will be the managerial labour market. Executives, 
mindful that other jobs might be more lucrative and challenging, will 
want to perform well in their current positions and this will require 
them to work effectively for their present employers. At the same 
time, they will know that the board of directors might orchestrate a 
managerial shake-up in the event that earnings are stagnant or 
declining. Fears on the latter count have become more acute in recent 
years since the job security of chief executives has apparently 
become more tenuous, due partly to the growing influence and 
vigilance of independent directors on corporate boards (Neff and 
Ogden, 2001; Lublin and Murray, 2001; cf. Leonhardt, 2000). As the 
director of a large US publicly quoted company said in 2000 shortly 
after the dismissal of the CEO, “there is zero forgiveness. You screw 
up and you’re dead.” (Lublin and Murray, 2001).  
Also pertinent will be executive compensation. During the past two 
decades, managerial remuneration has become much more strongly 
“incentivised” in the US. Between 1980 and the late 1990s, the 
percentage of chief executives of publicly quoted corporations that 
were awarded stock options increased from 30 per cent to more than 
70 per cent (Hall and Liebman, 1998: 663; Conyon and Murphy, 
2000: F647).  Indeed, by 1997, a typical CEO received more pay in 
the form of option grants than salary (42% of total remuneration as 
compared with 29%) (Conyon and Murphy, 2000: F646-47).   
A distinctive feature of stock options is that they operate somewhat 
like a “one-way” bet for management. This is because while 
shareholders and an executive entitled to exercise options both 
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shareholders suffer genuine losses whereas the executive simply 
must forego a potential profit opportunity (Cheffins, 1997: 657). 
Correspondingly, a management team that has a large number of 
options will tend to discount adverse outcomes when evaluating 
which business opportunities to exploit. With stock options now 
playing such an important part of CEO compensation, it follows that 
those running public companies have a financial incentive to proceed 
with projects that shareholders might like but creditors will fear:   
those that might yield spectacular returns but which encompass 
“downstream” risks that could cause default in the event of a mishap 
(Plender, 2000).
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The market for corporate control is an additional factor that can 
influence managerial decision-making and thereby motivate 
executives to pursue strategies that could leave their corporation 
vulnerable in the event things go wrong. The theory involved is well-
known (see Cheffins, 1997: 119). If there is a substantial disparity 
between a corporation’s actual and potential performance, a bidder 
may calculate that it is worthwhile making a tender offer to the 
shareholders to buy their equity with a view to installing new 
managers. The bidder’s assumption will be that with new direction 
the target company will generate enough additional profit to 
compensate for the costs and risks associated with making the offer.   
Executives fear takeover bids since they usually lose their jobs after a 
successful offer. This anxiety, however, has a beneficial by-product:  
managers, with their jobs potentially being on the line, have an 
incentive to deploy corporate assets to best advantage. On the other 
hand, apprehension about a possible bid can cause managers to 
respond in a way that wreaks havoc on the capital structures of their 
companies. For instance, target managers may engage in a leveraged 
recapitalization to consolidate control of the firm, thus adding a large 
layer of new debt to the firm’s balance sheet. More generally, 
executives might seek to make their corporation less attractive as a 
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not be able to finance an acquisition of the corporation as easily if it 
is heavily leveraged.   
Kahan and Rock (2002) argue that in the US, the relative potency of 
the disciplinary mechanisms just described has been reconfigured 
over the past two decades. Partly due to the prevalence of poison 
pills, there has been a transition from tender offers opposed by those 
running the target company (“hostile” bids) to proposals supported 
by management (“friendly” bids). Though defining precisely whether 
a takeover bid is hostile or friendly can be difficult (Schwert, 2000), 
the switch implies a shift away from acquisition activity that is 
explicitly disciplinary in orientation in favour of deals motivated by 
the desire to increase market share or generate synergies. This does 
not mean, however, that the disciplinary pressures US executives 
face have abated. Instead, the market for managerial talent and 
executive compensation have functioned as “equilibrating devices”.
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This is because, as we have seen, the incentives they create for 
managers to focus on shareholder value have become stronger in 
recent years. 
Regardless of the relative importance of disciplinary mechanisms 
that influence executives of America’s publicly quoted corporations, 
the fact that those in charge should be motivated to focus closely on 
share prices has potentially significant bankruptcy ramifications.   
Consider a scenario that the literature on financially distressed 
companies suggests is highly plausible (see Khanna and Poulsen, 
1995; Andrade and Kaplan, 1998). A publicly quoted firm has a 
positive operating income but also has a substantial debt load 
because those in charge have been pursuing costly but worthwhile 
ventures predicted to earn excellent returns for shareholders over 
time.  Conditions outside the control of those in charge subsequently 
render the company unable to service its debts. This highly leveraged 
but otherwise sound and viable company will end up facing financial 
distress that could result in liquidation.  
  24The evolutionary theory of corporate governance and corporate 
bankruptcy suggests that an outsider/arm’s-length system of 
ownership and control will function more smoothly if there is a 
framework in place designed to preclude the outcome just described.  
What is contemplated is that those running a troubled but viable 
business will have the option to continue running the firm, at least 
initially, rather than losing their jobs as soon as formal bankruptcy 
proceedings are commenced. Consider the advantages this offers 
from the managerial perspective. If bankruptcy meant immediate 
ouster, executives would face, ex ante, an unpleasant combination of 
possible results. On the one hand, if they adopted a “safety first” 
mentality they would fail to reap the rewards available under their 
managerial services contracts and they could face dismissal at the 
hands of outside directors or a takeover bidder. On the other hand, if 
they pursued promising but risky ventures that required substantial 
corporate borrowing, they would be out of a job if factors beyond 
their control led to the launch of bankruptcy proceedings.   
For managers, this sort of “lose-lose” regime can be addressed in a 
couple of possible ways. One shift could be a reconfiguration of the 
pattern of ownership and control. The idea here would be that 
managers, fearful of a combination of market forces and harsh 
bankruptcy law, would seek out large, stable, “relational” 
shareholders. The presumption would be that those owning 
substantial blocks of equity would take a “hands on” role with firm, 
thus muting the need for discipline via incentive-oriented executive 
pay, aggressive outside directors and hostile takeover bids.   
The other obvious move would be to attenuate the unforgiving nature 
of corporate bankruptcy. In this instance, reform would allow 
managers of financially distressed companies scope to remain at the 
controls so as to organize, where feasible, a restructuring. A widely 
held view is that in the US legal constraints deter the sort of 
“relationship investing” just described (see Frenchman, 1993: 170; 
Hawley and Williams, 2000: 147-65). Correspondingly, according to 
  25the evolutionary theory, it should not be surprising that a “manager-
driven” bankruptcy law has emerged.
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Chapter 11 offers a distressed company the chance of rehabilitation.  
There is no requirement that a firm entering reorganization 
proceedings be insolvent, so managers are able to direct the timing of 
entry.  Once there, the directors remain in control and continue to run 
the business. Creditors, secured and unsecured alike, are stayed from 
enforcing their claims. In due course, they must vote on a plan of 
reorganization. Their ability to vote against a proposal gives creditors 
some leverage against the debtor, but the leverage is limited in 
important respects. The creditors may not propose an alternative plan 
for at least the first 180 days,
32 so the consequence of non-acceptance 
would only be the further prolongation of proceedings. Besides, the 
debtor has control of the agenda, being able to determine the classes 
into which the creditors are placed for voting purposes. Provided that 
one impaired class can be persuaded to consent, non-consenting 
classes can be ‘crammed down’.
33 This, though, would necessitate a 
costly cram-down hearing, which could be avoided simply by giving 
consent to the debtor’s proposal. Chapter 11 further facilitates a 
debtor’s ability to reorganize by giving the debtor extensive powers 
to arrange new, post-petition  financing—including the power in 
some circumstances to “prime” existing security interests.
34 
Of course, executives are frequently fired  during, or immediately 
before, Chapter 11 proceedings (Gilson et al, 1990). When this 
happens, it has a significant impact on their human capital, in that 
they are unlikely to hold senior positions again for a number of years, 
if ever (Gilson, 1989). Our point is not that this never happens, rather 
that managerial turnover is not automatic, which ensures that their 
risk of loss of human capital is minimised.
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Turn now to the insider/control-oriented approach to corporate 
governance. As we have seen, the received wisdom in Germany and 
Japan is that banks constitute the focal point of the insider financial 
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bankruptcy, neither country shares with the United States a manager-
driven regime (Skeel, 1998: 1380-86). Instead, in both Germany and 
Japan the vast majority of firms are liquidated if there is a bankruptcy 
filing.  Admittedly, the two countries do have procedures available 
under bankruptcy law for reorganizing a financially troubled 
company.  Still, in Germany a “debtor in possession” rescue is not 
contemplated. In Japan this is a possible option but there is no 
automatic stay in the event that such a rescue is commenced and the 
relevant procedure has been largely moribund because of procedural 
complexities (Skeel, 1998: 1385; Alexander, 2000). The upshot is 
that in both countries executives of distressed companies cannot 
count on arranging a second chance under corporate bankruptcy law.  
Let us now consider Germany and Japan within the context of the 
evolutionary theory. Assume for a moment that Germany and Japan 
offered a manager-driven bankruptcy regime like the U.S. This sort 
of arrangement would potentially undermine in a serious way the 
leverage of a company’s “main bank”. The problem would be that 
the managers of a troubled company could file for bankruptcy and 
attempt to pilot the restructuring process themselves. To be sure, the 
prospects for successful reorganization would be dim unless the bank 
was eventually persuaded to sign on. Still, bankruptcy would provide 
a mechanism that executives could use to keep at bay a pivotal 
monitor of their corporation’s affairs.   
By contrast, a manager-displacing bankruptcy regime powerfully 
reinforces the leverage of lenders. If the executives of a financially 
troubled company know they will immediately lose their jobs if its 
“main” bank launches formal bankruptcy proceedings, they will 
listen closely to what representatives from the bank have to say. 
Manager-displacing bankruptcy is thus a natural component of 
insider governance, and this is what we see in Germany and Japan.
36   
  27As mentioned, insider/control-oriented financial systems have come 
under pressure in recent years. Since the evolutionary theory 
contemplates a feedback loop between corporate governance and 
bankruptcy law, it follows that the equilibrium which currently exists 
in Germany and Japan could be unstable. More precisely, the theory 
implies that a reconfiguration of bankruptcy law along manager-
friendly lines could be on the cards.   
Consistent with what the evolutionary theory implies, there are hints 
of a transition towards a manager-driven bankruptcy regime in 
Germany and Japan.  German companies were given a more robust 
reorganization option under the country’s bankruptcy laws in the late 
1990s, though the new procedure still lacks the “debtor in 
possession” feature that characterizes chapter 11 in the US (Skeel, 
1998: 1385). In Japan, steps are currently being taken to streamline 
the cumbersome “debtor in possession” reorganization option that 
already exists (Alexander, 2000). If outsider governance truly takes 
hold in these countries, the evolutionary theory predicts that further 
changes in favour of manager-friendly bankruptcy law are in 
prospect. 
C. Evolutionary Theory and “Family Capitalism” 
One additional point deserves consideration when thinking about the 
contours of the evolutionary theory. This is the relevance of its 
insights in circumstances where a country has an insider/control-
oriented system of ownership and control but banks do not play the 
sort of role typically ascribed to them in Germany and Japan. The 
topic merits consideration because, as we have seen, classifying 
financial systems on the basis of whether they are “bank-based” or 
not is an exercise fraught with difficulties.    
If banks do not dominate an insider/control-oriented corporate 
economy then who does? Family-owned companies are typically a 
strong contender.  We are not concerned in this instance with small, 
closely-held business enterprises (which are considered in Section 
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family members own a large of block of shares and may well hold 
key managerial posts. Italy constitutes a classic example of a country 
where this sort of “family capitalism” is highly influential. For 
instance, according to figures from the mid-1990s, the largest 
shareholder in Italy’s publicly quoted companies owns, on average, 
just over 50% of the shares and a family is the most important 
blockholder in nearly one out of three of such firms. Ownership is 
even more concentrated among major business enterprises not quoted 
on the stock market (Bianchi, 2002). At the same time, while bank 
loans are the largest net source of external finance for Italian 
companies, banks do not play a significant or active role in corporate 
governance (Carpenter and Rondi, 2000).   
Various industrialised countries in Europe (e.g. France and Belgium) 
and East Asia (e.g. Taiwan and South Korea) share the Italian model 
of corporate governance to some degree.
37 Given this, it is 
worthwhile considering how “family capitalism” fits with the 
evolutionary theory. As a starting point, it is important to bear in 
mind how governance problems differ depending on whether a 
corporation quoted on the stock market has widely dispersed share 
ownership or has shareholders who own enough equity to exercise 
“inside” influence.   
In a widely held company, executives can potentially take advantage 
of the latitude afforded to them by passive shareholders to impose 
agency costs by acting in an ill-advised or self-serving manner. On 
the other hand, when control in a company is highly consolidated, 
managerial accountability is unlikely to be a matter of great urgency.  
This is because the dominant shareholder(s) should have a strong 
financial incentive to keep a careful watch on what is going on and 
should have sufficient influence to discipline and ultimately remove 
disloyal or ineffective managers (Cheffins, 2000).   
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problem in companies with a dominant blockholder, a different 
danger exists. This is that core investors will collude with 
management to extract, via “rent-seeking”, private benefits of 
control.
38 For instance, a controlling shareholder might engineer 
“sweetheart” deals with related firms in order to siphon off a 
disproportionate share of a public company’s earnings.   
Alternatively, an entrepreneur motivated by vanity, sentiment or 
loyalty might continue to run the business for too long or might 
transfer control to family members who are ill-suited for the job 
(Cheffins, 2000; La Porta et al 2000).  
Minority shareholders clearly may be vulnerable to expropriation in 
the manner just described (La Porta et al, 2000). They, however, are 
not the only potential victims; those lending money to the company 
also potentially qualify. We have already seen that there can be 
“agency costs of debt” when managers take actions that are 
calculated to benefit shareholders at the expense of lenders. When 
dominant shareholders collude with management, the dynamics will 
be somewhat different since the anticipated benefits will run directly 
to corporate “insiders”
39 rather than collectively to those owning 
equity. Still, the effect for lenders will be much the same since the 
risk of default will be greater, all else being equal.   
Those lending to a company with a dominant family owner will 
presumably be aware of the particular risks associated with this sort 
of firm and can therefore take certain precautions. For instance, as 
we will see, concentrated debt (i.e. a small group of lenders) can 
potentially serve as an effective counterweight to concentrated share 
ownership. Bankruptcy rules, however, can also serve as a beneficial 
corrective mechanism.   
To understand the role which bankruptcy law can play, it is important 
to recognise that with a publicly quoted company dominated by a 
family, possible abuse of manager-friendly bankruptcy procedures is 
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the support of a family blockholder should be insulated from the sort 
of shareholder pressure that might otherwise arise with a financially 
distressed company. Moreover, the coalition of management and 
family owners will be well placed to control the agenda vis à vis 
creditors. This is because by initiating a debtor-in-possession 
corporate reorganization, the insiders should be able to remain in 
control at least so long as the rescue effort is ongoing.  
The situation is quite different with a manager-displacing bankruptcy 
law. Under these circumstances, the creditors will have much greater 
leverage since it will fall to them to decide whether the firm should 
continue. Certainly, if key lenders determine the business is 
fundamentally sound and conclude that those in charge were capable 
and unlucky rather than lazy or dishonest, an option would be to save 
the existing business via a workout arranged outside bankruptcy. On 
the other hand, if serious doubts exist about the economic viability of 
the company or the qualities of those in charge, the lenders can 
dictate the outcome which will probably suit them best: an orderly 
liquidation. The upshot is that a manager-displacing bankruptcy 
framework aligns well with an insider/control-oriented system of 
ownership and control, regardless of whether banks contribute 
fundamentally to corporate governance or not.  
The reality of family-dominated governance often is much messier 
than this brief overview would suggest. In South Korea, for instance, 
the government has put heavy pressure on bank lenders to bail out 
troubled firms, rather than permitting them to fail (Milhaupt, 1998). 
It is not possible to address the implications of governmental rescues 
of financially distressed firms at this point. Still, it is worth noting 
here that when such activity is prevalent, other aspects of 
government policy may overwhelm bankruptcy law’s contribution to 
corporate governance.  Correspondingly, political factors may 
displace the equilibrium which evolutionary theory implies should 
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control is configured. 
 
IV. The Evolution of English Corporate Bankruptcy Law 
A. The Evolutionary Theory and the UK:  The Hypothesis to be 
Tested 
As we have seen, for theories that seek to account for the 
development of dispersed share ownership in particular countries on 
the basis of politics and law, the UK constitutes something of a 
“problem child”.  Is this also the case with the evolutionary theory?  
In this section and the two that follow, we consider this issue. 
Again, the received wisdom is that the UK is an “outsider/arm’s 
length” system of corporate governance.
40 Also, Britain, like the 
United States, has a “shareholder economy” where private enterprise 
is about maximizing profits for those who invest. Moreover, as is the 
case in the US, a series of legal and institutional mechanisms serve to 
align managers’ interests with those of shareholders. These include 
the market for managerial talent, performance-sensitive executive 
compensation schemes, and an active market for corporate control.
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Admittedly, with the factors that induce executives to take into 
shareholder interests, they do not operate with identical intensity in 
the US and the UK. For instance, managerial services contracts in the 
US are more highly “incentivised” than those in Britain (see Conyon 
and Murphy, 2000: F646-47). On the other hand, the market for 
corporate control potentially should have a stronger disciplinary 
aspect in Britain because UK companies have less scope to take 
defensive measures to fend off hostile takeover bids (Deakin and 
Slinger, 1997).  Still, the key point for our purposes is that British 
executives operate under constraints that motivate them to maximize 
shareholder value. Concomitantly, like their US counterparts, they 
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potential “upside” but which also could threaten the viability of the 
company if things go wrong.    
Given the manner in which the UK corporate economy is configured, 
the evolutionary theory of bankruptcy law would predict that the 
regime governing financially distressed companies would exhibit 
“manager-driven” characteristics. Otherwise, executives would face 
the unpalatable “lose-lose” scenario described in part III.  Let us be a 
bit more precise with our prediction, however, by taking timing into 
account. The UK corporate economy evolved towards dispersed 
share ownership in the decades immediately following World War II. 
The posited complementarity between manager-friendly bankruptcy 
law and dispersed share ownership would suggest that over the same 
period the regulation of corporate financial distress would have 
become increasingly “manager-driven” in orientation.   
Did events in fact unfold in this fashion? Or is this another instance 
where the UK qualifies as a “problem child”? As we will see now, a 
review of the evolution of English insolvency law—the 
terminological equivalent of US corporate bankruptcy law
42—
supports the latter view. Indeed, the evidence suggests that as share 
ownership was becoming more widely dispersed in the UK, the legal 
rules governing corporate financial distress went in the opposite 
direction the evolutionary theory would predict. To see why this is 
the case, it is convenient to consider chronologically the leading 
methods available to deal with corporate financial distress under 
English law.
43 Those available prior to the mid-1980s will be 
considered first. Reforms taking place at that time will then be 
analysed. The section will conclude by discussing possible future 
changes to the law.    
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Procedures Available Prior to the Mid-1980s 
English corporate insolvency law has developed through bursts of 
legislative activity interspersed with incremental development by the 
judiciary. Regardless of the source of law, the tendency has been for 
innovations to be introduced alongside existing procedures, rather 
than as their replacements.
44 The consequent plethora of procedures 
is apt to confuse the uninitiated. So as to simplify our exposition, we 
will introduce the law by explaining how it would apply in a series of 
stylised examples involving a hypothetical financially distressed 
company.  
English corporate insolvency law’s first period of legislative 
innovation occurred during the middle of the nineteenth century.   
Concurrent with the creation of a facility for incorporating limited 
liability companies by straightforward means, corporate insolvency 
law was “born” in the mid-19
th century.
45 The pivotal innovation 
Parliament made was introducing a procedure by which a court could 
order the winding up of a company that was unable to pay its debts, 
the descendant of which is today found in Part III of the Insolvency 
Act 1986.
46 Currently, when a court grants a winding up order, the 
judge will appoint a liquidator whose duty it is to ensure “that the 
assets of the company are got in, realised and distributed to the 
company’s creditors”.
47 This process, which is typically referred to as 
“liquidation”, has similarities with proceedings launched under 
Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code.  
Let us use an example to illustrate the practical effect of liquidation 
for an English company and its managers. Assume our company is 
failing to meet its financial obligations as they fall due. Unpaid 
creditors potentially could seek to enforce their claims by suing on 
the outstanding debt and by obtaining court orders authorising the 
seizure and sale of specified corporate assets. This is where winding 
up can come in. A creditor who anticipates receiving more of what is 
  34owing if there is an orderly liquidation as opposed to a piecemeal 
scramble for assets can respond by petitioning to court for a winding 
up order.  
Assuming a judge grants a winding up order, this will have two 
principal effects. The first is that unsecured creditors will be 
precluded from proceeding further with enforcement actions.
48 This 
“automatic stay” assists in the preservation of any going-concern 
value and correspondingly should increase the amount available 
collectively for distribution to those making a claim under the 
liquidation (Jackson, 1986: 7-19). The second is that the company’s 
directors will be automatically removed from office,
49 thus leaving 
the liquidator free to wind up the company’s affairs in the manner 
that will yield the best return for creditors.
50 Once the liquidator has 
completed selling the company’s assets and has distributed the 
proceeds to outstanding claimants, the company will be dissolved. 
The upshot is that liquidation is clearly a “manager-displacing” 
procedure.
51  
A crucial limitation of winding-up, as a means of realising value for 
creditors making a claim, is that it does not stay enforcement action 
by secured lenders.
52 Instead, a creditor with a security interest is 
entitled to stand outside the bankruptcy process and the liquidator 
must be careful not to interfere with the rights which exist to enforce 
the security (Fletcher, 1996: 633). The pivotal right a secured 
creditor has, once there has been default, is a licence to seize and sell 
the security to satisfy the amount owing (Goode, 1995: 689-91). 
Often, an enforcement agent known as a “receiver” will be appointed 
to exercise the rights in question (Goode, 1995: 692-93).   
To illustrate, let us consider again our hypothetical. If our financially 
distressed company had used part of its assets as collateral for 
secured debt, the liquidator would have to hand over the relevant 
assets to the receivers who had been validly appointed. Once the 
collateral had been disposed of, if the proceeds were sufficient to 
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entitled to the surplus (Fletcher, 1996: 633). Otherwise the 
liquidator—and the unsecured creditors on whose behalf the 
liquidator acts—would receive nothing.    
The power which secured creditors have to seize and sell collateral 
can potentially create havoc for a financially troubled company. This 
is because it will be difficult for those in charge to conduct business 
in an orderly fashion if various parties are exercising claims against 
key assets on a piecemeal basis. Matters, however, can proceed 
differently if one creditor (or a cohesive coalition of creditors acting 
collectively) has a security interest in all of a company’s assets 
(Picker, 1992; Buckley, 1994; Armour and Frisby, 2001).  In this 
case, only one receiver will need to be appointed to realise the 
security and marshalling the assets in one hand can facilitate an 
orderly response to the company’s financial crisis.   
English law ultimately evolved in a manner that was very favourable 
to the enforcement of security by one party. In the mid-19
th century 
English lawyers began to draft for clients clauses granting security 
against all present and future property and in short order hospitable 
judges recognised the validity of such instruments.
53 Known as a 
“floating charge”, this type of security interest did not have a direct 
counterpart in the US until the adoption of the Uniform Commercial 
Code in the various states. This is because US judges were unwilling 
to accept the idea of an all-encompassing floating lien until 
legislation implementing Article 9 of the U.C.C. specifically 
authorised the use of security encompassing all of a debtor’s present 
and future property.
54 Even now, the English floating charge offers 
an important advantage as compared with its American floating lien 
counterpart: in England there is no equivalent to the federally-
imposed stay of enforcement in bankruptcy.
55  
Also noteworthy was that English judges permitted the holder of a 
floating charge, upon default, to put a receiver in place without 
  36recourse to the courts.
56 By virtue of changes made by the Insolvency 
Act 1986, a receiver appointed under a debenture containing a 
floating charge which gives the chargee priority to substantially the 
whole of the company’s assets is deemed to be an “administrative 
receiver” and has certain powers and duties derived from statute.
57 
Still, this private version of receivership remains very different from 
what was known in the US as an “equity receivership”, where the 
courts never relinquished control over the appointment process (see 
Skeel, 2001: 56-60).  
To see how receivership works as an insolvency procedure, let us 
return to our hypothetical while changing the facts slightly.  Assume 
now that the company has raised most of its debt finance by 
borrowing from a bank. The bank has secured the amount owing to it 
by having the company grant a floating charge over all present and 
future property.
58 Our company becomes financially distressed, thus 
entitling the bank to launch formal enforcement proceedings under 
the security agreement.
59 If the bank decided to exercise its rights, it 
likely would terminate the company’s management powers by 
appointing an administrative receiver
60 who would take control of the 
collateral.
61 The receiver would then decide on a strategy to 
maximize the recovery of the secured creditor. This could involve 
shutting down operations immediately so as to sell individual assets 
on a break-up basis, continuing to trade with the intention of 
auctioning the business as a going concern or perhaps initiating a 
corporate rescue operation designed to restore the company to 
profitable trading.
62   
In theory, despite enforcement proceedings under a floating charge, 
one of the company’s unsecured creditors could petition to have our 
company wound up.
63 The advent of winding up would not, however, 
terminate the administrative receivership.  Instead, the receiver 
would remain free to exercise its powers in relation to the assets 
subject to the floating charge.
64 Since a liquidator must stand on the 
sidelines until the administrative receivership is complete, in all 
  37likelihood there would be nothing left to sell on behalf the unsecured 
creditors.
65 Given that the company would probably be nothing more 
than an “empty husk”, the unsecured creditors would likely not waste 
their time securing such an appointment. Ultimately, the assetless 
shell would simply be removed from the Register of Companies on 
grounds of non-activity.
66  
What would be the fate of the managers of our hypothetical company 
during an administrative receivership? There is a good chance they 
would remain in office for the duration of the process.
67 Still, the 
broad effect of the appointment of an administrative receiver is to 
divest a company’s directors of their management powers during the 
currency of the receivership (Goode, 1997: 230). Since our company 
likely would be an “empty husk” once the receivership was 
concluded, appointment of the administrative receiver would 
correspondingly be the “end of the road” for the managers of our 
company.
68   
From the foregoing, it should be evident that prior to the mid-1980s 
formal regulation of corporate financial distress under English law 
was, to use the terminology of the evolutionary thesis, “manager 
displacing”. Again, as we have just seen, for the managers of our 
hypothetical company, appointment of a receiver under a floating 
charge would almost certainly put them on the sidelines. The 
granting of a winding up order would have an even more decisive 
outcome since it would result in their automatic removal.   
Let us now return to the evolutionary theory. It posits that manager 
displacing bankruptcy laws are complementary to concentrated share 
ownership. Throughout the opening decades of the 20
th century, this 
sort of congruence was evident in the UK. In larger business 
enterprises, including those with publicly quoted shares, the founders 
and/or their heirs generally retained a sizeable percentage of the 
voting equity and played an influential role in managerial decision-
making (Cheffins, 2001b: 466-68). With this sort of “insider” 
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law would be manager-displacing, and this is just what we see.  
Later events, however, potentially create a paradox for the 
evolutionary theory. As time progressed, family control became less 
pervasive in larger UK companies and at some point between the 
1950s and 1980s the divorce between ownership and control became 
sufficiently wide for the Britain to acquire its outsider/arm’s-length 
governance regime (Cheffins, 2001b: 466-68). The evolutionary 
theory would predict that this trend should have been accompanied 
by a shift towards “manager-friendly” bankruptcy law. 
Comprehensive reform of corporate bankruptcy law did not occur, 
however, in tandem with the shift towards dispersed share 
ownership. Instead, the status quo prevailed until the middle of the 
1980s.
69 At this point, significant changes were made. Did this yield 
the transition to “manager friendly” bankruptcy law which the 
evolutionary theory would predict? As we will see now, the answer is 
no.   
C. Corporate Bankruptcy Reform in the Mid-1980s 
In 1977, the U.K.’s Trade Secretary responded to growing 
dissatisfaction with the law governing corporate and personal 
bankruptcy by establishing a Review Committee on Insolvency Law 
and Practice (Fletcher, 1996: 14-15). Known as the “Cork 
Committee”, after its chair, Sir Kenneth Cork, it published its report 
in 1982 (Insolvency Law Review Committee, 1982). The reform 
process culminated in the enactment of wide-ranging reforms in the 
Insolvency Act 1985.
70 This legislation, in turn, was quickly 
superseded by the Insolvency Act 1986, which continues to govern 
corporate bankruptcy today.
71    
In assessing the extent to which the reform of corporate bankruptcy 
law in the mid-1980s conformed with the manager-friendly transition 
the evolutionary theory would predict, two aspects are of direct 
relevance. The first is the introduction of a new “rescue” procedure, 
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between this procedure and Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. 
Both function under judicial supervision, both are supposed to serve 
the interests of all creditors rather than a particular class (e.g. those 
with security) and both are explicitly designed to rehabilitate ailing 
firms (Franks and Torous, 1992: 70, 74, 78-79).  For the purposes of 
the evolutionary theory, however, the differences are of greater 
importance.  
To see how administration works, let us return to our hypothetical 
financially distressed company. Let us alter the facts again, 
incorporating assumptions that are more realistic for a large British 
firm with publicly quoted shares. Instead of borrowing from one 
bank holding a floating charge, our company has now raised its debt 
finance from a wide range of lending institutions. A substantial 
fraction of the loans are unsecured and might well be syndicated, 
which means that dozens of banks will have taken a share of a given 
loan (Economist, 1997: 72). The firm also has some secured debt but 
has not granted a floating charge so the various secured creditors 
only have claims against specified assets.
72   
An important difference under these new facts is that there will not 
be a creditor that has a security interest over all of the company’s 
present and future assets. This, in turn, will preclude the appointment 
of an administrative receiver, who again would have had the option 
of keeping the business running with the objective of auctioning it as 
a going concern or organising a corporate rescue.
73 As we have seen, 
prior to 1985, the outcome in circumstances where there was no 
creditor with an all-encompassing security interest was either an 
inefficient piecemeal liquidation or a winding up order. The 
administration procedure introduced by the Insolvency Act 1985 was 
designed to help in situations like this. The intention was that an 
administrator appointed by the court would have powers akin to a 
receiver appointed under a floating charge and thus would be suitably 
positioned to orchestrate, if possible, the survival of the business via 
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Carruthers and Halliday, 1998: 115-16).  
For an administration order to be open to our company, a petition 
would have to made to court by the company itself, by its directors or 
by one of its creditors.
74 The judge, in turn, would be entitled to 
make an administration order if doing so would be likely to achieve 
the survival of the company as a going concern, a better realisation of 
the assets than in winding-up or a beneficial reorganisation of the 
company’s debt structure.
75 If the court in fact granted the 
administration order,
76 this would impose a moratorium on the 
enforcement of creditors’ rights and remedies, including those arising 
from security interests.
77 This freeze on creditor rights is roughly 
equivalent to the “automatic stay” under Chapter 11 of US 
bankruptcy law.
78 The idea is that those seeking to rehabilitate 
companies must have a “breathing period” to develop an orderly plan 
for action without having to fight a rearguard battle with creditors 
eager to seize corporate assets (Carruthers and Halliday, 1998: 153, 
178).   
While proceedings conducted under chapter 11 and under 
administration orders do share an automatic stay in common, the 
resemblance between the two ends abruptly when consideration is 
paid to the treatment of directors (Goode, 1997: 274). One of the 
major features of Chapter 11 is that management of the company is 
left in charge.  The premise underlying this “debtor in possession” 
rule is that the incumbent executives have crucial detailed knowledge 
of the company’s operations and customers. The contrast with 
administration is stark, since English insolvency law is predicated on 
the assumption that the last people to leave in control of a failing 
business are those who were responsible for the company’s plight in 
the first place.  Correspondingly, the Insolvency Act 1986 requires 
that the administration of a company be placed in the hands of an 
external manager (an “administrator”) who must be a qualified 
insolvency practitioner.
79   
  41With respect to our hypothetical company, the absence of a “debtor 
in possession” feature akin to Chapter 11’s means that, upon the 
granting of an administration order, the administrator would take 
control of the company and manage its affairs.
80 The company’s 
incumbent directors and officers might well remain in post. They 
would be obliged, however, to co-operate with the administrator and 
they would not be permitted to exercise any of their managerial 
powers in a way that might interfere with the administrator.
81  
Moreover, it would be the administrator’s prerogative to remove the 
incumbent directors and appoint replacements.
82 The upshot is that, 
while the appointment of an administrator might facilitate the 
preservation or rehabilitation of the business conducted by our 
hypothetical company, the administration order would not offer to 
the executives the “manager-friendly” outcome chapter 11 provides. 
A second aspect of the reform of English insolvency law which took 
place in the mid-1980s that is relevant for our analysis of the 
evolutionary theory involves the sanctioning of irresponsible or 
dishonest directors.
83 As part of the reform effort Parliament gave the 
judiciary new powers to punish directors for misconduct related to 
the running of their companies.  More specifically, the introduction 
of rules concerning “wrongful trading” made it easier for a judge to 
impose personal liability on directors of failed companies.
84  Also, 
Parliament expanded considerably the grounds upon which a court 
could order that an individual be disqualified from serving as a 
director.
85   
To illustrate the effects of these changes, consider again our 
hypothetical company. Assume our directors allowed the business to 
continue to operate when they ought to have known it had no 
reasonable prospect of survival. Unless they also took every 
reasonable step to avoid insolvent liquidation, they would have 
engaged in wrongful trading as defined by the Insolvency Act 1986.
86 
The liquidator of the company would then have the option of seeking 
  42an order requiring the directors to contribute personally to the assets 
available to the creditors.
87   
If there were a finding of wrongful trading, civil liability would not 
be the only potential sanction for the directors. Instead, an order 
could also be made under the Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986 disqualifying them from serving on a corporate board for a 
period of up to fifteen years.
88 There might, in addition, be other 
grounds for disqualification. Of greatest practical importance, the 
directors could also face a disqualification penalty if their company 
ended up insolvent and they had engaged in conduct rendering them 
“unfit” to serve as directors.
89   
A director’s conduct does not have to be dishonest for there to be 
“unfitness” under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.  
Instead, it will be sufficient if the individual has been lax in attending 
to accounting matters, has irresponsibly delegated managerial powers 
or has otherwise engaged in conduct which demonstrates 
recklessness.
90  If a judge, upon an application from the Department 
of Trade and Industry, ultimately finds any of the directors of our 
hypothetical company to be unfit to serve in that capacity, the judge 
would be obliged to disqualify them for a period of between two and 
fifteen years.
91     
The introduction of liability for wrongful trading and the expansion 
of the grounds for disqualification meant that for managers the 
consequences of financial distress were potentially more severe than 
was the case prior to the mid-1980s. This outcome is directly 
contrary to what the evolutionary theory would predict since share 
ownership had become progressively more diffuse prior to the 
introduction of these reforms. Still, it may be that Britain was, by the 
mid-1980s, in a period of temporary disequilibrium that continues to 
this day but which will not persist much longer. If the UK was poised 
to make corporate insolvency law more manager-driven, that would 
lend much credibility to this interpretation of events. Since 
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to conclude this section by examining the relevant trends to see if the 
UK is in fact moving belatedly in the direction the evolutionary 
theory implies it should.  
D. Recent Developments 
In 2001, the UK government published a White Paper outlining 
reforms to bankruptcy law that it was intending to enact in the near 
future (DTI, 2001).
92 With respect to corporate bankruptcy,
93 the 
most important change outlined in the White Paper concerned the 
abolition of administrative receivership and its replacement with an 
expanded form of administration procedure (DTI, 2001: 9-12). The 
government’s view is that banks are sometimes too quick to use their 
rights under floating charges to appoint receivers. Correspondingly, it 
wants to channel corporate financial distress through administration, 
on the assumption that this will serve to level the playing field for 
creditors and will give more scope for corporate rescues. For our 
purposes, though, the pivotal point is that implementation of the 
proposed reforms will have little effect on the position of managers. 
This is because those in charge will be sidelined by the appointment 
of an administrator just as surely as they currently are with an 
administrative receivership. 
With the reform of bankruptcy law, a trend of greater relevance for 
the evolutionary theory is a possible shift towards explicitly 
authorised “debtor-in-possession” corporate rescues. A mechanism 
of this sort has in fact recently been enacted for “small” UK 
companies, defined on the basis of annual turnover, total assets and 
liabilities and the number of people employed.
94 Still, since our focus 
at this point is on the sort of large enterprises that are susceptible to 
dispersed share ownership, the details of the new scheme will not be 
considered here.  Instead, we will postpone discussion of the 
statutory changes affecting “small” companies until part VIII of the 
paper, which deals explicitly with closely held corporations.  
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of the introduction of a procedure that would allow a corporate 
restructuring to occur with the “debtor in possession”, but the status 
of this proposal is unclear.  In 2000, a review group that had been 
established to assess reform of the UK’s corporate bankruptcy laws 
offered its views on the topic (Insolvency Service, 2000a).   
Apparently prompted by lobbying in favour of a mechanism akin to 
chapter 11, the review group considered whether a “debtor in 
possession” reorganization procedure should be made available for 
larger companies.  The review group thought the idea was interesting 
but left further consideration of the matter to a steering group that 
had been established in 1998 to coordinate reform of the UK’s 
companies legislation.
95  The steering group, however, declined the 
invitation to evaluate the case for reform, reasoning that bankruptcy 
policy was beyond its terms of reference (Company Law Review 
Steering Group, 2001: 279).   
The White Paper published by the UK government in 2001 did not 
mention the “debtor in possession” issue so it seems unlikely that 
legislative reform is currently on the agenda.  This does not mean, 
however, that changes to the law are out of the question entirely.  
Instead, it would seem that if the “debtor in possession” procedure 
that is now available to “small” companies is a success, the relevant 
procedures could ultimately be rolled out for larger business 
enterprises as well (Trade and Industry Select Committee, 1999: para 
24).  If this happened, or even if it seemed likely to happen, the shift 
would provide strong support for the evolutionary hypothesis.  At 
this point, however, it is premature to say that English bankruptcy 
law is configured in the manner this theory would predict.    
Let us summarise where things stand after considering the “law on 
the books”.  Throughout the early part of the 20
th century, matters fell 
into line with the evolutionary thesis since share ownership was 
concentrated and bankruptcy law was manager-displacing.  This 
alignment, however, was disrupted as dispersed share ownership 
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law was amended in the 1980s but, contrary to what the evolutionary 
theory would predict, the relevant changes were “unfriendly” to 
management.  Reform is again on the agenda but it is too early to 
predict the results.  It follows that in order to reconcile the British 
experience with the evolutionary theory, one must go beyond the law 
“on the books” to achieve this.  The next section of the paper seeks to 
do this by examining whether the received wisdom on UK share 
ownership is correct.   
 
V. Does the UK have an “Insider/Control-Oriented” System of 
Ownership and Control?    
On the basis of the received wisdom concerning the UK’s system of 
ownership and control and its bankruptcy laws, the British 
experience clearly poses a challenge to the argument that a manager-
driven bankruptcy regime is integrally related to a corporate 
economy dominated by widely held companies. It may still be 
possible, however, to reconcile the theory with the facts. One way 
this might be done is by subjecting to critical scrutiny the assumption 
that the UK is a country with an “outsider/arm’s-length” system of 
ownership and control.  While Britain is typically grouped together 
with the United States as a country where widely held companies 
dominate the corporate economy, ownership of corporate equity is 
more concentrated in the UK than it is in the US (Black and Coffee: 
1994: 2002; Cheffins, 1997: 638-39).  Possibly, then, Britain has 
been miscast as an “outsider/arm’s length” country.  If this is in fact 
the case, then its manager-driven bankruptcy regime should align 
with its system of ownership and control in the manner which the 
evolutionary theory would predict.   
The collective ownership stake of institutional investors (e.g. pension 
funds, insurance companies and the British equivalents of mutual 
funds, referred to as investment trusts and unit trusts) highlights why 
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functions on an outsider/arm’s length basis. In the United States, 
institutional shareholders own approximately 50 per cent of the 
shares of the country’s publicly quoted companies, with the 
remainder being held directly by individual investors (Cheffins, 
1998: 52).  In the UK, in contrast, the equivalent figure is more than 
70 per cent (Committee on Corporate Governance, 1998: para 5.1; 
Colby, 1999: 28).  Correspondingly, with companies lacking a “core” 
shareholder, the potential for control by a group of institutions should 
be greater in Britain than it is in the US. Certainly, sociologist John 
Scott has cited institutional ownership to argue that in UK public 
companies where there is not a dominant owner, control exists by a 
“constellation of interests” (Scott, 1990: 354-55, 359-65; Scott, 1998: 
48-50; 83-89). Moreover, Geof Stapledon, an Australian legal 
academic, has asserted in a study of institutional investors in Britain 
and Australia that “the highly diffuse ownership structure described 
by Berle and Means (does) not exist in the vast majority of quoted 
UK…companies” (Stapledon, 1996: 10).
96  
Aside from the fact that institutional shareholders in the UK own a 
higher percentage of corporate equity than their counterparts in the 
US, in other ways the conditions in Britain are better suited for such 
investors to exercise control on a co-ordinated basis. One 
consideration is ownership concentration.  In Britain, it is common 
for a company’s twenty-five largest institutional investors to own a 
majority of the shares.  In the US the same number of institutions 
will typically only own about 1/3 of the equity in a corporation 
(Cheffins, 1997: 638-39; Franks et al, 2001).  This means it will be 
easier in Britain to form a coalition that has voting power sufficient 
to get management’s attention (Coffee, 1994, 852-53; Cheffins, 
1997: 638-39).   
The legal environment is also potentially significant.  In the US, 
securities law imposes certain constraints and restrictions on 
investors that impede the formation of institutional coalitions in 
  47relation to particular corporations.
97 In Britain, on the other hand, 
communication between financial institutions that own corporate 
equity is largely unregulated (Stapledon, 1996: 271-72).    
While the differences between Britain and the US need to be 
acknowledged, it is one thing to point to the potential for control in 
the UK and another to say that this is turned into reality on any sort 
of consistent basis (Davies, 1993: 82). Admittedly, it does seem that 
institutional investors in the UK are more inclined to exercise 
influence on a joint basis than their American counterparts. An 
“activist” institutional investor in the US will typically pursue its 
own agenda and act as a “lone wolf” or “Lone Ranger” (Coffee, 
1997: 1977-78; Black, 1998: 461). In contrast, in Britain, it is by no 
means extraordinary for institutional shareholders to co-ordinate their 
efforts and deal with corporate management on some sort of 
collective basis (Black and Coffee, 1994: 2050-52; Stapledon, 1996: 
125-27; cf. Holland, 1995: 34-36).  Also, if a UK public company has 
an unhealthy balance sheet and is seeking to correct matters by 
issuing fresh equity to existing shareholders (a “rights issue”), 
institutions owning equity will quite often require a management 
shake-up before agreeing to purchase shares (Stapledon, 1996: 129-
30; Franks et al, 2001).  Such demands typically will be taken very 
seriously since “the time you really get a chance to have an influence 
on the company is if they want money” (Stapledon, 1996: 129; 
Franks et al, 2001: 15).  
Still, on balance, it remains fair to characterize the predominant 
approach to corporate governance in the UK as being 
“outsider/arm’s-length”.
98  For instance, the special case of poorly 
performing companies does not provide adequate grounds for 
disqualifying Britain from this category.  This is because shareholder 
discipline also tightens in the US with such firms, albeit via the 
purchase of share blocks by potentially active investors rather than 
by way of conditions attached to the provision of new equity 
  48financing (Triantis and Daniels, 1995: 1086; Franks et al, 2001: 25-
26).     
More generally, a review of institutional investment commissioned 
by the UK government and conducted by Paul Myners provides 
strong evidence that an “outsider/arm’s-length” verdict is appropriate 
for Britain. The acknowledged that in the previous few years there 
had been a considerable movement towards an activist stance by 
institutional investors (Myners, 2001: 89).
99 Still, he said the 
initiatives taken by those acting on behalf of the institutions left 
much to be desired.  To quote from the report:  
“It remains widely acknowledged that concerns about the 
management and strategy of major companies can persist among 
(company) analysts and fund managers for long periods of time 
before action is taken” (Myners, 2001: 89). 
According to Myners, this pattern was prevalent because 
interventionist strategies were unlikely to deliver the quick results 
financial professionals desired and because there was a culture in the 
investment community of wanting to avoid confrontations with 
companies (Myners, 2001: 91).
100  Also pertinent were potential 
conflicts of interest, stemming primarily from the fact that an 
institutional investor would not want to acquire a reputation as a 
governance “troublemaker” when an affiliate was offering 
investment banking services to corporate clients (ibid).  
The Myners Report’s verdict on institutional passivity is consistent 
with views expressed by various other observers.  Paul Davies (1991: 
139), currently a professor at the London School of Economics, 
wrote that a “systematic and continuous relationship between 
institutional shareholders and management had yet to evolve.” Jack 
Coffee and Bernard Black (1994: 2086), two US law professors, 
noted in a 1994 article on Britain that “the complete passivity 
announced by Berle and Means” was absent but remarked upon “the 
reluctance of even large shareholders to intervene”.  According to a 
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46), there was some intervention on specific corporate governance 
issues (e.g. executive remuneration and the separation of the 
chairman of board and chief executive) but institutions only second-
guessed managerial strategy formulation in the event of a crisis.  A 
Financial Times survey of the financial directors of the UK’s 100 
biggest companies (Martinson, 1998: 21) indicated that while routine 
questioning of management by financial professionals was becoming 
more professional, “shareholders rarely…tried to use their muscle to 
make changes behind the scenes.”  Finally, two forthcoming studies 
by financial economists cast doubt on the monitoring role played by 
institutional shareholders.  One reveals that the presence or absence 
of a pension fund owning 3% or more of a company’s outstanding 
equity makes no difference to its financial performance (Faccio and 
Lasfer, 2002) and the other indicates that institutions owning large 
blocks of shares do not accelerate management turnover in poorly 
performing companies (Franks et al, 2001: 17, 19, 26).  
Given the available evidence, the verdict on UK institutional 
investors offered by a newspaper columnist appears apt:  “(a) certain 
very British reserve…unmistakably remains” (Financial Times, 
1997: 10).  Correspondingly, despite the potential for control by 
institutional shareholders, Britain is correctly classified as a country 
with an “outsider/arm’s-length” corporate economy.  It follows, in 
turn, that recategorizing the UK’s system of ownership and control is 
not a convincing way to bring the British experience into line with 
the thesis that a manager-driven bankruptcy regime is integrally 
related to a corporate economy dominated by widely held companies.   
How can we move forward from here?  There are two possibilities.  
One is to reassess Britain’s bankruptcy regime to determine whether 
it is, in substance, manager-friendly despite having features 
commonly associated with a manager-displacing system.  We will 
examine this possibility in the next section of the paper.   
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line”. The existing literature on corporate governance convergence 
concentrates on equity rather than debt, with the structure of share 
ownership being the pivotal concern. Thus far the discussion of the 
UK in this paper has, save for the analysis of bankruptcy laws 
offered in the previous section, conformed to this pattern. This has 
served thus far to conceal a potentially important difference between 
the US and the UK, this being that corporate debt has a considerably 
stronger market-oriented tinge in America than it does in Britain. In 
the UK, bank loans are the dominant form of corporate borrowing 
(Corbett and Jenkinson, 1997: 82-83).  Issues of loan capital, 
comprising unsecured debt and debentures secured by means of a 
charge on corporate assets,
101 have not been a major source of 
external finance (ibid; Lister and Evans, 1988: 92).
102  In contrast, in 
the US the market for the equivalent form of debt, referred to as 
“bonds”, is well-established and is important for larger corporations 
seeking to raise cash (Corbett and Jenkinson, 1997: 84-85; 
Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999: 1; McLaughlin, 2001).  Sections VII 
and VIII of the paper shed light on the significance of this distinction 
between the US and the UK.  
  
VI. Reassessing the UK’s Corporate Bankruptcy Regime:  Is it 
‘Manager-Friendly’ In Practice? 
As we have now seen, English corporate insolvency law is strongly 
manager-displacing and the UK’s system of ownership and control is 
properly classified as “outsider-arm’s length”. It would be premature 
to conclude, however, that the evolutionary hypothesis is falsified 
with respect to Britain. This is because examining bankruptcy law 
“on the books” does not yield a full account of the way in which 
financial distress is addressed in UK companies. Instead, firms that 
actually end up bankrupt under the Insolvency Act 1986 are just the 
tip of the proverbial iceberg. For every company that ceases to 
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“workout” will be successfully negotiated, thus allowing profitable 
trading to resume.   
Statistical evidence suggests that informal workouts are of particular 
importance in a British context. On average 3.65% of US 
corporations went into bankruptcy proceedings during any given year 
during the 1990s. The equivalent figure for Britain was only 0.67% 
(Klapper, 2001: 15, Table 2). It seems unlikely that a disparity of this 
sort occurred as a result of US companies encountering financial 
distress more often than their UK counterparts, particularly since 
American macroeconomic conditions were if anything, better than 
Britain’s during the 1990s.
103 A more plausible explanation is that 
financially distressed companies in the US are more likely to enter 
formal bankruptcy proceedings than their British counterparts. 
Empirical evidence indicating that publicly quoted firms in the UK 
that suffer this fate are poorer performers—in terms of equity returns 
over the years preceding filing—than their US counterparts indicates 
this is probably the case (Armstrong and Riddick, 2000). 
Why, all else being equal, are financially distressed companies in the 
UK less likely to end up in bankruptcy proceedings? One likely 
explanation for the disparity is that American law offers more scope 
for a corporate rescue than its English counterpart. Correspondingly, 
plausible turnaround candidates are dealt with under bankruptcy law 
much more frequently in the US than in Britain. To elaborate, in the 
US, with a corporation that enters chapter 11, some type of 
rehabilitation effort will typically be contemplated. In the UK, on the 
other hand, the invocation of corporate insolvency law has typically 
been treated as the end of the road for a company. Admittedly, the 
administration procedure discussed in Part IV is designed to assist in 
the rehabilitation of troubled companies that are worth saving. There 
has, however, been an “abnormally low incidence of usage” of this 
procedure (Fletcher, 1996: 479).
104    
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disparity between the US and the UK. To understand why, a bit of 
background is required. All else being equal, the transaction costs 
associated with a private renegotiation should increase with the 
number of creditors involved since the collective action difficulties 
will be greater. This prediction is borne out by a range of studies on 
financially distressed companies that show informal restructuring is 
more likely to be attempted where debt is concentrated in the hands 
of relatively few lenders (Gilson et al, 1990: 354; Chatterjee et al, 
1996: 12-13; cf. Franks and Torous, 1994).   
Let us turn now to the US and the UK.  With the typical publicly 
quoted company, corporate debt is more diffuse in America than it is 
in Britain. To be more precise, the UK firm will be more likely to 
rely on bank loans than its American counterpart, which will be more 
inclined to incur debt by selling bonds to investors at large (Brierley 
& Vleighe, 1999: 175; Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999: 1; Bevan and 
Danbolt, 2001). It follows, in turn, that the transaction costs 
associated with organising an informal workout should be lower in 
Britain. All else being equal, then, formal bankruptcy proceedings 
should be less common in the UK than in the US.  
One should not overestimate the extent to which debt is concentrated 
in Britain.  Notably, UK public companies do not borrow primarily 
from a “main” bank. Instead, the loans in question will typically be 
syndicated, in part because regulatory requirements mean that banks 
need to diversify the default risk associated with lending very large 
sums.  Still, even syndicated debt is unlikely to be as diffusely held 
as corporate bonds. Correspondingly, for the typical publicly quoted 
company, debt will be more concentrated in the UK than it is in the 
US.  
Turning now to the informal processes invoked when financial 
distress compels large UK companies to carry out debt restructuring, 
one of us has done an empirical study on the topic (Armour and 
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105 One of the most interesting findings was that, 
whilst each restructuring does differ in certain respects, there is a 
striking degree of homogeneity in the way in which the negotiations 
are approached. More precisely, in most instances negotiations about 
debt “workouts” for large UK companies are structured in 
accordance with what is known in the banking community as the 
“London Approach”.  
The “London Approach” is worth investigating for our purposes 
because it may offer a “manager-friendly” substitute to formal 
bankruptcy law. To the extent it does so, the UK may begin to fall 
into line with what the evolutionary theory would predict.  Again, the 
“law on the books” suggests that Britain is a “manager-displacing” 
jurisdiction, which does not “fit” with the theory because the country 
has a dispersed share ownership structure. On the other hand, if an 
informal process such as the London Approach is a pivotal 
“manager-friendly” substitute for formal bankruptcy proceedings, 
then Britain should no longer be a “problem child” for the 
evolutionary theory. 
To explain what happens in a London Approach workout, let us 
reconsider the last stylised example we referred to in section IV.
106  
Recall that this involves a large company with widely dispersed share 
ownership.  The firm has borrowed from banks by way of unsecured 
syndicated loans and also has some debt that is secured over 
specified assets. The company has now become financially distressed 
and the banks are aware of this. Unless the situation is obviously 
hopeless, the banks will likely organise a “London Approach” 
workout. 
Invocation of the London Approach typically involves two distinct 
phases.
107 First, the banks who have participated in the syndicated 
loans will agree amongst themselves to a “standstill”, during which 
no enforcement actions will be taken against the corporate debtor.  
This informal moratorium will last for a relatively short period of 
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appointed by the banks, will investigate the company’s finances. If 
the team determines that the underlying business is not viable as a 
going concern, then bankruptcy proceedings—usually 
administration—will be commenced.
108 On the other hand, if the 
accountants ascertain that key aspects of our company are sound 
enough to resume profitable trading in due course, the workout will 
move to the second stage.   
The second stage of the London Approach consists of the negotiation 
and implementation of a restructuring plan. A “lead bank”—typically 
the bank with the largest exposure
109—will coordinate the rescue 
effort and act as a conduit for information from the company and the 
investigating accountants to other participating lenders, and vice 
versa.
110 Assuming our company reaches the second stage of the 
London Approach, various outcomes might follow. One possibility is 
a financial reorganisation designed to restructure the debt burden.   
Typically, any reductions in return (“haircuts”) that banks agree to 
take as a result will be divided pro rata in proportion to expected 
returns in a hypothetical liquidation judged from the time of the 
commencement of the standstill. More radically, the company might 
face sweeping operational restructuring and/or a programme of 
divestment designed to raise cash. Since invocation of the London 
Approach is typically kept secret, with the key participants entering 
confidentiality agreements, our company’s trade creditors, employees 
and individual shareholders probably would be unaware of the 
attempted rescue until these sorts of activities were undertaken. 
The key to the success of a London Approach renegotiation is that, 
primarily via reputational sanctions that apply to “repeat players”, 
bank participants adhere to the “rules”.
111 To be more precise, with 
respect to the “standstill” that marks the first stage of the London 
Approach, the banks will fall into line with respect to a particular 
company even when they might do better by immediate 
enforcement.
112 Furthermore, the banks will not undermine the 
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strategies designed to extract a larger slice of the pie. To the extent 
that they do squabble over who gets what, this will be disguised as 
disagreements about appropriate valuations or about legal priorities 
in insolvency. The result is that the lead bank should be well situated 
to negotiate with the financially troubled company as agent for all the 
bank lenders.  
A London Approach rescue effort has certain similarities with a 
reorganization conducted under Chapter 11. For example, both are 
“debtor in possession” procedures since the directors of the 
financially troubled company will continue to manage the company 
throughout the restructuring. Also, with both the primary objective is 
to reverse the fortunes of a financially troubled company. Moreover, 
in most rescues carried out under the London Approach and chapter 
11, key creditors end up receiving a lower return and/or will be paid 
later than was originally agreed.   
Still, while there are similarities between chapter 11 and the London 
Approach, the latter is not “manager-driven” in the same way as the 
former. With chapter 11, a company’s executives can commence the 
procedure themselves and thereby invoke a judicially administered 
automatic stay.  Management can therefore create breathing space for 
a rescue regardless of scepticism on the part of the creditors.   
Under the London Approach, the situation is considerably different.  
With this procedure, it is the banks, not management, that take the 
initiative. Correspondingly, British executives cannot elect to keep 
creditors at arm’s-length in the same way as their US counterparts.  
Also, once a London Approach rescue has been commenced, the 
banks that are participating can decide collectively to abandon the 
plan at any point and petition for administration or liquidation. The 
managers who end up sidelined as a result of such a choice have no 
effective recourse.
113   
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Approach rescue will not reverse the choice lightly. The primary 
deterrent is that abandoning the privacy of a London Approach in 
favour of formal bankruptcy proceedings will probably constitute a 
highly negative signal that will cause the value of the troubled 
company’s assets to drop precipitously.
114 Still, even though banks 
will hesitate before authorising a switch out of the London Approach, 
the fact remains that managers of a financially troubled company are 
more dependent on creditor goodwill under the London Approach 
than under chapter 11.
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The greater vulnerability of managers under the London Approach is 
made more acute by an additional factor. This is the involvement of 
shareholders. Those owning equity will want any sort of corporate 
rescue to succeed because they will receive nothing if a company is 
liquidated with its liabilities exceeding its assets.
116 It may be, 
however, that a financially troubled firm will need an injection of 
cash to have a serious chance of resuming profitable trading. In the 
UK, a potentially important source of funding in this context will be 
a rights issue, which involves a fresh issue of shares to existing 
investors. As we have seen in Section V, though, when a financially 
distressed company carries out a rights issue, institutional 
shareholders will quite often require a management shake-up before 
agreeing to participate. Correspondingly, executives who might 
otherwise be able to keep their jobs in a London Approach workout 
could end up out of work as a result of institutional activism.  
To conclude this section, a holistic appraisal of the options facing a 
UK publicly quoted company that is financially distressed requires 
that account be taken of informal restructuring. Under the London 
Approach, which is the procedure most often invoked with troubled 
large business enterprises, incumbent executives can usually 
anticipate remaining in office so long as the banks which are 
participating have faith in the management team.  Hence, Britain is 
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as Part IV’s review of the “law on the books” implies.   
Still, while taking into account informal workouts justifies a partial 
reappraisal of the regime governing financially distressed companies 
in the UK, it would be going too far to label Britain as a “manager-
driven” jurisdiction. This is because executives do not have sufficient 
control over the procedures that can be invoked in the event of 
financial distress to justify any such conclusion. As we saw in Part 
IV, managers of a financially troubled company are obliged to stand 
to one side if creditors choose to rely on an administrator, if an 
administrative receiver is appointed or if a successful petition for 
winding up is made. With the London Approach, while senior 
executives typically retain their posts, the banks that participate 
always do have the option of terminating the procedure and resorting 
to formal bankruptcy proceedings. Also, if fresh funds are being 
sought from existing shareholders, key investors may require a 
managerial shake-up before they will proceed. The upshot is that 
even once the London Approach is taken into account, Britain is 
considerably less “manager-friendly” than the evolutionary theory 
would predict for a country with dispersed share ownership. The UK, 
then, remains a “problem child”, which implies that the theory should 
be recast.  Sections VII and VIII of the paper take up this task.     
 
VII. Refining the Evolutionary Thesis in Light of the UK 
Experience 
In the last three parts, we have explored British corporate governance 
through the lens of the evolutionary thesis. Once we move beyond 
the “black letter” account of British governance, and take a more in 
depth look at the way the governance mechanisms function in 
practice, some of the initial puzzles disappear. But not all. Britain 
remains a somewhat awkward fit even for the evolutionary theory.  
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explain the UK away as an aberration. 
In this part, we take the former approach. The discussion that follows 
will extend and adjust the evolutionary theory, and use the refined 
theory to try to make better sense of the governance patterns we 
observe in Britain. In its original incarnation, the evolutionary 
theory– like each of the other major theories-- focused principally on 
the role of equity in the overall governance framework.
117 The role of 
banks in out of court restructurings under the London Approach 
suggests, however, that the nature of a firm’s debt– in particular, 
whether the debt is concentrated or diffuse– may also have crucial 
governance implications. It is this insight– the need to incorporate 
debt and related “below the line” considerations more fully into the 
analysis– that serves as the launching off point for the analysis that 
follows. 
A. Adding Debt to the Evolutionary Theory 
What should we make of the concentration or diffusion of a firm’s 
equity and debt? To start, it seems likely that most firms whose stock 
is concentrated will also have one or a small number of debt holders. 
The reasoning is as follows. If a firm has a group of dominant 
shareholders, these shareholders will control the firm’s management 
(see La Porta et al, 1999: 500). The coordination of ownership and 
control can reduce managerial agency costs, but it also may magnify 
the agency costs of debt– that is, the danger that shareholders will 
expropriate value from the firm’s debtholders by increasing the 
riskiness of the firm or taking other actions that benefit equity at the 
expense of debt (see Klein and Coffee, 1996: 353-57).
118 If the firm’s 
debtholders are scattered, collective action problems may interfere 
with their ability to control the agency costs of debt.
119 Scattered 
debtholders may fail to monitor because their stakes are too small or 
they would prefer to free ride on the efforts of others. In short, the 
combination of concentrated equity and diffuse debt creates a 
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Smith, 2000). 
This does not mean that the agency costs of debt will go entirely 
unchecked if a firm with concentrated equity issues diffuse debt. At 
least two factors may reduce the seriousness of the problem. First, 
the agency costs of debt loom largest if the firm’s fortunes are 
volatile or it is in financial distress.
120 The agency costs of debt are 
lower for healthy firms and firms that have limited debt in their 
capital structure. 
Second, the agency costs of debt can be constrained to some extent 
by contractual terms in parties’ debt agreement. Existing debentures 
include a variety of provisions that are designed to facilitate 
monitoring by, or on behalf of, scattered bondholders. Most 
debentures place substantial restrictions on a firm’s right to make 
dividends to their shareholders, for instance, and require the firm to 
make sure that its cash flow significantly exceeds the firm’s debt 
repayment obligations (McDaniel, 1986). 
In practice, the debtholders themselves are generally not the ones 
who enforce the provisions. Instead, existing bond agreements 
contemplate that an indenture trustee will monitor on their behalf. By 
coordinating the monitoring function, the trustee thus replicates to 
some extent the monitoring capabilities of concentrated debtholders.  
The trustee is an imperfect substitute for bank loans or other forms of 
concentrated debt, however. In the U.S., for instance, the 
effectiveness of indenture trustees is limited in important respects.
121     
Although trustees can be given more authority in the UK, even 
trustees with wide-ranging powers cannot renegotiate the terms of 
the debt agreement without obtaining the approval of a majority of 
the diffuse bondholders.   
Overall, then, there will be a general pressure for firms with 
concentrated ownership to look to bank loans for their debt finance, 
rather than issuing public debt, due to the superior ongoing 
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that this is a general tendency, rather than a fixed rule. One can easily 
think of counterexamples, such as the issuance of junk bonds to 
finance leveraged buyouts in the US in the 1980s.
122  The benefits of 
borrowing from banks rather than issuing public debt are likely to be 
more pronounced, moreover, for firms that are financially precarious 
or whose fortunes are volatile—that is, firms for which the agency 
costs of debt are a significant issue. 
  One additional caveat about the correlation between concentrated 
equity and concentrated debt (CE/CD) is in order. By emphasizing 
the importance of concentrated debt, we are not suggesting that the 
optimal number of lenders in a firm with concentrated stock is one.  
There may be good reasons for the firm to borrow from a group of 
banks, rather than a single lender. Recent empirical evidence 
suggests, for instance, that firms in many countries can borrow at 
more attractive interest rates if they borrow from more than one 
lender.   Volpin (2001) speculates that this is because it is more 
difficult for a controlling shareholder to extract private benefits of 
control if there are multiple lenders. The lenders themselves may 
have additional reasons for syndicating. As noted earlier, the UK 
regulatory regime encourages banks to syndicate major loans; even 
in the absence of regulatory strictures, moreover, banks may wish to 
limit their exposure to any given borrower. Whatever the optimal 
number of lenders proves to be, however, the lenders will structure 
the loan so that they are well-positioned to actively monitor the 
debtor. 
In contrast to insider-controlled firms, firms with diffuse stock are 
likely to rely less on bank lenders and more on publicly issued debt.  
(That is, there is a general tendency toward diffuse equity and diffuse 
stock, or DE/DD). The obvious reason for this is cost. The same 
qualities that make bank lending valuable for insider-controlled 
firms, such as banks’ ability to provide active monitoring, make bank 
loans more costly in contexts where these services are less important 
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123 On balance, active monitoring is likely 
to be less critical for firms with diffuse stock, since the agency costs 
of debt are likely to be lower if there is no concentrated group of 
shareholders to influence the direction of the firm. In addition, the 
combination of diffuse equity and concentrated debt (DE/CD) may 
increase the risk of expropriation by the concentrated lenders. Like 
controlling shareholders in a firm with CE/DD, the concentrated 
lenders might be in a position to extract rents from the firm’s diffuse 
shareholders.  The lenders might strike an implicit bargain with 
managers, for instance, pursuant to which the lenders receive 
supracompetitive interest rates or provide other banking services at 
supracompetitive prices to the firm in return for favorable treatment 
of the firm’s managers (see Gordon and Schmid, 2000: 46-47).
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Although the factors just described—most importantly, the cost of 
bank monitoring-- suggest there will be a general pressure toward 
disintermediation with firms that have diffuse stock, at least one 
countervailing consideration may check this tendency. Just as bank 
lenders or other concentrated debtholders are well-positioned to 
actively monitor a healthy firm, as discussed above, they also can 
coordinate more easily than diffuse debtholders in the event of 
financial distress.  Their ability to coordinate may significantly 
reduce both the overall cost of financial distress and the risk that 
viable firms will be mistakenly liquidated or nonviable firms 
continued. As we have seen with the London Approach in Britain, if 
lenders can restructure firms outside of bankruptcy, there is no need 
for formal insolvency proceedings. These benefits suggest that the 
combination of diffuse equity and concentrated debt (DE/CD) may 
not be as undesirable as it appears at first glance, especially with 
firms that are financially unstable. On the other hand, the very 
possibility that a firm’s reliance on bank lenders might be construed 
by the market as an adverse signal—that is, as an indication of 
instability—may provide an additional reason for firms with diffuse 
equity to issue public debt for their debt finance wherever possible. 
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in firms’ stock and debt finance should not be taken to imply any 
particular developmental order as a historical matter. Although one 
might be tempted to assume that markets for publicly issued stock 
are likely to precede public markets for debt, this is not necessarily 
so. Indeed, the reverse often appears to be the case. In the United 
States, for instance, public markets for debt seem to have developed 
well before stock ownership became truly diffuse.
125 Similarly, the 
past decade has seen a dramatic increase in the issuance of public 
debt throughout Europe (McLaughlin, 2000; Hoffmann et al, 2001). 
Although there also has been a great deal of talk about the diffusion 
of European equity during this time, the growth in the European bond 
market does not seem to have been tied to the concentration or 
diffusion of firms’ stock in any direct way.    Each of these examples 
may lead to the combination of concentrated stock and diffuse debt 
(CE/DD).  We would expect this combination to be transitory, 
because of the financial agency cost problems it creates. Diffuse 
stock and diffuse debt (DE/DD) is more likely to be the equilibrium 
state. During the interim, it obviously is crucially important either for 
firms to minimize their reliance on debt finance, or to develop an 
institutional mechanism for controlling the agency costs of debt.
126 
To summarize, then, firms’ capital structure decisions will reflect a 
trade-off between the agency costs of debt, on the one hand, and the 
higher costs of bank lending, on the other. In firms with concentrated 
equity, the agency costs of debt will be a major concern, and this 
concern is most easily addressed with concentrated debt. Thus, 
CE/CD is a natural equilibrium.  If a firm’s equity is diffuse, on the 
other hand, there will be a general pressure to forego bank lending 
and issue public debt, due to its lower cost and the diminished 
importance of the agency costs of debt. If financial distress is a 
significant concern, the coordination advantages of concentrated debt 
may offset the tendency toward disintermediation. As a result, while 
DE/DD is likely to be the natural equilibrium, DE/CD may itself be a 
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gradual one. 
To complete our initial discussion, we need only incorporate these 
distinctions into the evolutionary thesis as a whole. In an insider 
governance system, the revised thesis predicts that insider control 
(and thus concentrated equity) will be accompanied by concentrated 
debt. In such a regime, we are likely to find a manager-displacing 
approach to bankruptcy, which reinforces the debtholders’ ability to 
monitor the controlling shareholders. Takeovers, incentive-based 
compensation, and other market-based governance devices will play 
a relatively limited role. Outsider/arm’s length governance is 
characterized by diffuse stock, liquid markets, and a more market-
oriented approach to corporate governance.   
The diffuse equity of an outsider/arm’s length regime fits more 
naturally with a reliance on bonds and other forms of publicly issued 
debt, rather than bank finance. Together with extensive use of bonds, 
we are likely to find a manager-driven, reorganization-based 
approach to bankruptcy. If firms issue large amounts of diffusely 
held debt, moreover, the formal bankruptcy rules will take on 
particular importance, due to the collective action problems faced by 
creditors in the event of financial distress.  
Having sketched out the reconfigured evolutionary theory, we now 
turn to the question whether the theory offers a better explanation of 
UK governance. 
B.  UK Governance Through the Lens of the Refined Theory 
What does the refined theory tell us about Britain? The first thing one 
notices is that UK governance raises precisely the issues discussed at 
the end of the last section.  As we have seen, although equity 
ownership is more concentrated in the UK than in the US, British 
governance is best characterized as outsider/arm’s length, with 
relatively diffused share ownership and increasingly market-based 
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debt and a manager-friendly bankruptcy regime (DE/DD). But the 
debt in even the largest UK firms is generally quite concentrated 
(Brierley and Vleighe, 1999; Bevan and Danbolt, 2001).  Rather than 
issuing public debt, most British firms rely on a relatively small 
consortium of banks and other lenders for their debt finance. Thus, 
UK governance consists of DE/CD, rather than either of the obvious 
equilibria of DE/DD or CE/CD. 
To put the current parameters of British governance into perspective, 
recall that the diffusion of U.K. stock ownership is still recent and 
ongoing. As we have seen, British firms did not shift to the arm’s 
length model until after World War II. During this period, the formal 
British insolvency procedures retained the distinctively manager-
displacing character that we might have expected in the earlier, 
insider governance era – if anything, recent reforms such as the 
penalties for wrongful trading have underscored the manager 
displacing quality. Yet, as we saw in Part VI, British firms are often 
restructured outside of the formal insolvency process through the 
London Approach. In contrast to the severity of the formal 
procedures, the London Approach parallels U.S. Chapter 11 in some 
respects.  Creditors have more control under the London Approach 
than in the U.S., for instance, but British corporate managers often 
initiate the process and they remain in their posts while the firm is 
examined in connection with the restructuring. For large UK firms, 
the bankruptcy regime might perhaps be characterized as 
intermediate, rather than either manager-driven or manager-
displacing. 
The London Approach vividly illustrates the most important benefit 
of a regime that combines diffuse equity with concentrated debt: 
concentrated debtholders can respond in coordinated fashion to 
financial distress.  It is conceivable that UK governance will retain its 
current characteristics for precisely this reason. Yet bank financing is 
comparatively costly, as we have seen, which suggests that one can 
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possible. Firms with diffuse equity may be able to borrow more 
cheaply from public markets than from banks. We suspect that this is 
what increasing numbers of UK firms will do. 
Indeed, there is evidence that banks already are losing their near 
hegemony over debt finance for widely held UK firms. In recent 
years, British firms have increasingly turned to other institutional 
lenders, such as insurers and pension funds, for debt financing 
(Economist, 1997: 72).  Although the market for public debt remains 
much smaller than in the U.S., it has significantly increased in recent 
years. It seems likely that this trend will continue, and perhaps 
accelerate, in the coming years.
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If we have correctly read the handwriting on the wall, and British 
firms look increasingly to public debt markets for capital, the 
diffusion will have important and obvious implications for the 
London Approach to corporate insolvency. Crucial to the London 
Approach is the relatively limited number of lenders, each of which 
has a substantial interest in the troubled firm’s debt. As we have 
seen, these lenders can restructure the firm outside of the formal 
bankruptcy process because they do not face the kinds of collective 
action problems that make formal bankruptcy proceedings necessary 
in other contexts. The lenders have enough at stake to justify 
participating in the process, and each knows who the other players 
are. As a result, they can coordinate the decision whether to 
restructure the firm among themselves, without the need for judicial 
oversight or a formal automatic stay. 
As debt finance becomes more diffuse, the London Approach could 
lose its effectiveness for many publicly held firms (Brierley and 
Vleighe, 1999; Armour and Deakin, 2001). Scattered bondholders 
cannot coordinate nearly as easily outside of bankruptcy as a 
syndicate of lenders can.
128 Rather than restructuring through the 
London Approach, firms with diffuse debt are therefore more likely 
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encounter financial distress. 
This does necessarily mean that we will see a relentless increase in 
formal UK insolvency proceedings, of course. If the London 
Approach becomes increasingly cumbersome for troubled firms, the 
parties can be expected to respond in a variety of ways. One 
possibility is that creditor groups and professionals may begin to 
insert new, workout friendly terms into bond indentures and other 
forms of debt to facilitate the restructuring process. Existing bonds 
already provide for a trustee to act on behalf of the scattered 
bondholders in a variety of contexts, such as issuing notices, 
declaring defaults, and filing proofs of claim in bankruptcy (see 
Kahan, 1995). Issuers also could include voting provisions that 
bound all of a group of debtholders to any restructuring agreed to by 
a majority of the class.
129 These provisions could preserve the 
parties’ ability to restructure troubled companies outside of formal 
insolvency proceedings, and as a result could pave the way toward 
still more disintermediation. 
Although workout-friendly terms might serve as a partial substitute 
for the London Approach in its current form, many of the limitations 
described above would remain. If a bond trustee coordinated the 
negotiations, for instance, rather than a syndicate of banks, it would 
be difficult to conduct the initial due diligence as quietly and 
unobtrusively as the parties do currently. The process would also 
require a significantly more complicated vote, since all of the 
bondholders would be entitled to have their say as to whether the 
restructuring should go forward. As a result, while some out-of-
bankruptcy restructurings would be likely to succeed, it is likely that 
more firms with significant going concern value would land in 
formal insolvency proceedings than currently is the case.  
One possible effect of the increased risk of formal insolvency 
proceedings might be to cause the managers of British firms to act 
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avoid ventures that created a risk of financial distress and follow 
through less aggressively on those projects that the firm did 
undertake. If the company did encounter financial distress, moreover, 
managers might take extraordinary risks in a last ditch effort to avoid 
Britain’s manager-displacing formal insolvency proceedings.   
Although the existing penalties for wrongful trading would limit the 
later concern—that is, the concern with extraordinary risktaking –
they magnify the concern that managers will be reluctant to follow 
through on appropriate business risks. 
If more firms with significant going concern value wind up in formal 
bankruptcy proceedings, we may also see a second effect: increasing 
pressure on British lawmakers to adopt aspects of a U.S.-style, 
Chapter 11 approach. As we have seen, U.K. bankruptcy laws are 
well-designed for liquidating insolvent firms, but they are less 
effective at preserving the going concern value of a firm that has 
encountered financial rather than economic distress. If debt finance 
becomes too diffuse for troubled firms to make use of the London 
Approach, the need for reorganization-oriented bankruptcy rules will 
become increasingly clear. Not just managers, but creditors also, can 
be expected to press for a loosening of the bankruptcy framework.
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As discussed earlier, there have already been rumblings along these 
lines. The INSOL lenders’ group has called for a stay to be added to 
the ‘scheme of arrangement’ provisions, for instance, and we suspect 
that it is only a matter of time before UK lawmakers respond. 
We should emphasise that each of the speculations we have engaged 
in—that UK debt finance may continue to diffuse, that we may see 
pressure to adopt U.S.-style bankruptcy rules—assumes that there are 
no dramatic, macro-economic shocks in the interim. Corporate 
governance obviously is only one factor in the overall corporate 
environment, and it may be swamped by larger events such as 
technological change or economic crisis.  Indeed, it is plausible that 
precisely these kinds of considerations help explain why debt finance 
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finance. The rapidly rising interest rates of the 1970s made public 
debt comparatively unattractive as compared to bank lending (Bank 
of England, 1982); this and related considerations may have 
dampened the pressures toward diffusion in UK debt finance. 
With these caveats in mind, let us summarise the insights of the 
revised evolutionary thesis for UK governance. The overall UK 
governance framework is outsider/arm’s length in character.   
Although the equity of UK firms is more concentrated than in the 
US, it is quite diffuse by world standards and large UK shareholders 
tend to play only a passive role in corporate governance in most 
circumstances. Market devices figure more prominently than 
monitoring by corporate investors.  Unlike the stock of UK firms, 
UK debt finance remains quite concentrated, particularly as 
compared to the US. It is plausible that these characteristics—
outsider governance with diffuse stock and concentrated debt—will 
endure, but the reconfigured evolutionary thesis predicts that there 
will be general, continuing trend toward disintermediation, due 
principally to the cost of bank lending as compared to publicly issued 
debt. If debt finance does become more diffuse, this may have a 
feedback effect on the UK’s formal insolvency rules; in particular, it 
may create pressure for lawmakers to adopt a more manager-driven, 
US style approach. 
We have made several predictions about the likely direction of UK 
corporate governance, but these predictions are not our most 
important point. The most important point is that there is a 
predictable relationship among equity finance, debt finance, and 
bankruptcy in a nation’s overall governance framework. Attending to 
all of these factors gives us a much richer understanding of 
comparative corporate governance in general, and U.K. governance 
in particular. 
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Closely Held Company 
The analysis thus far has given us additional insight both into British 
corporate governance and into the evolutionary thesis itself. To 
sharpen the focus of the evolutionary theory, we have needed to pay 
more explicit attention to the role of debt in corporate governance.  
We have pointed out that debt, like stock, will generally be more 
diffuse in an outsider/arm’s length system. By contrast, both equity 
and debt tend to be more concentrated in insider governance. 
The Article has focused almost exclusively on publicly held 
corporations, rather than smaller, closely held firms. There are 
obvious reasons for this emphasis. The vigorous debate over the 
conditions that make diffuse stock ownership possible is a debate 
about publicly held firms, and this Article has endeavoured to 
contribute to that debate. Similarly, the existing literature has tended 
to emphasise the agency cost issues that arise from the separation of 
ownership and control, and these issues are most apparent in publicly 
held firms. 
Despite the crucial importance of publicly held companies, the vast 
majority of firms are closely held, not public, even in nations such as 
the U.K. and U.S. In this section, we apply the insights of the 
reconfigured evolutionary theory to closely held companies. The 
analysis begins by predicting the likely relationship between debt and 
equity and closely held firms, as well as the likely role of bankruptcy.  
We then turn to the actual governance of closely held firms in the 
U.K. and U.S. As we shall see, the capital structure and general 
governance of closely held firms closely fit the predictions of the 
theory. When we turn to the bankruptcy procedures for closely held 
firms in the U.K. and U.S., on the other hand, we encounter 
significant puzzles. In the U.K., recent legislative initiatives have 
moved in a much more manager-driven direction than the theory 
would predict. The U.S approach to bankruptcy for closely held 
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puzzling for very similar reasons. Using the reconfigured 
evolutionary theory as a guide, this Part attempts to make sense of 
these puzzles, and to shed light on the governance of closely held 
firms. 
Unlike publicly held firms, there is little or no separation of 
ownership and control in a closely held firm.
131 Closely held firms 
are characterized by a significant—and often complete – overlap 
between the firm’s shareholders and its managers. Given the 
concentrated stock ownership, the evolutionary theory suggests that 
the debt finance of closely held firms is likely to be similarly 
concentrated in order to minimize the agency costs of debt. (Thus, 
CE/CD should be the equilibrium capital structure). With publicly 
held firms, as discussed in the last part, the combination of 
concentrated equity and concentrated debt calls for manager-
displacing bankruptcy. One might therefore expect to see a manager-
displacing framework for close corporation bankruptcy. 
The first of these predictions, that closely held firms will have 
concentrated debt, turns out to be quite accurate. Close corporations 
often borrow from a single bank, and most of the remaining firms 
have a relatively small number of lenders (Scott, 1986; Armour and 
Frisby, 2001; cf. Mann, 1997). Because ownership is concentrated, 
and their stock is not actively traded, close corporations are insulated 
from the market for corporate control and market-based governance 
devices. The governance of close corporations thus seems to exhibit 
many of the characteristics we have attributed to insider systems in 
the publicly held firm context. 
Turning to bankruptcy, however, we encounter striking anomalies in 
both the UK and the US.  Start with the UK. In the UK, most closely 
held firms look to banks as their principal source of debt finance.  
These bank loans are often secured by a “floating charge” on all of 
the firm’s assets (Armour and Frisby, 2001). As discussed earlier, the 
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receiver if the firm defaults on its loan.  Once appointed, the receiver 
is not subject to any automatic stay, and her task is to take control of 
the business and liquidate its assets. 
Everything described thus far fits neatly within the predictions of the 
evolutionary theory. The U.K. process, with its manager 
displacement and lender control, has precisely the qualities one might 
expect, given the concentrated shareholdings and debt of closely held 
firms.  Yet the winds of change seem, at least at first glance, to be 
blowing in a very different direction. Most importantly, the 
Insolvency Act 2000 has just introduced a new debtor-in-possession 
procedure for small firms.
132 The new provision will give the 
managers of small firms a more significant role in bankruptcy than 
ever before.
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In effect, these changes seem to suggest that the U.K. bankruptcy 
procedures for small firms may be evolving toward the U.S. 
approach, which has long had these same kinds of manager-driven 
provisions. Closely held U.S. firms use the same framework as their 
publicly held counterparts: Chapter 11, with its exclusivity period, 
automatic stay, and other manager protections.
134 Indeed, shortly 
after Chapter 11 was enacted, an empirical study of closely held 
debtors bemoaned that the debtors and their managers were now “in 
full control.” (LoPucki, 1983). Thus, the U.S. approach seems to 
embody, and the U.K. rules seem to be edging toward, precisely the 
opposite framework as the reconfigured evolutionary theory would 
predict.  Rather than a manager-displacing approach, one could 
construe these developments as a general convergence on manager-
driven bankruptcy. 
What can the evolutionary theory tell us about these puzzling 
developments?  Before more fully unravelling the puzzle, we should 
begin by highlighting a crucial distinction between closely held and 
public firms. In closely held firms, the principal source of the firm’s 
  72going concern value is usually the shareholder-owners—i.e., 
entrepreneurs – themselves. If the firm is to succeed, the 
entrepreneurs must retain their control rights; yet, in a close 
corporation, the control rights cannot be separated from the 
entrepreneurs’ ownership rights. As a result, when a closely held firm 
that is worth preserving files for bankruptcy (that is, it encounters 
financial rather than economic distress), the reorganization process 
needs to ensure that the entrepreneur emerges from bankruptcy with 
both her ownership and control rights intact (Baird and Rasmussen, 
2001; Ayotte, 2001; see also Armour and Frisby, 2001). The debtor-
in-possession approach, which keeps the entrepreneurial managers in 
place and permits them to propose a reorganization plan, is of course 
one way to achieve this outcome.  
Although the manager-driven, debtor-in-possession process helps to 
assure that entrepreneurs retain both ownership and control rights, a 
more creditor-oriented process like the traditional U.K. receivership 
could also achieve this effect. If the closely held firm is worth more 
as a going concern than in piece meal liquidation, the firm’s creditors 
have an obvious incentive to bargain to that outcome under most 
circumstances.
135 This possibility leads us to a second, quite different 
explanation for the apparent anomalies in both U.K. and U.S 
bankruptcy law. Quite simply: appearances are misleading. If we 
take a closer look, we will see that neither the U.K. nor the U.S. has a 
truly manager-driven framework for closely corporation bankruptcy.   
Turn first to the manager-driven Chapter 11 process that has long 
been in place for close corporations in the United States. For the 
owner-managers of a closely held corporation, the prognosis of a 
Chapter 11 filing is very different than for most publicly held firms.  
The managers of closely held corporations are nominally in control, 
but the vast majority of close corporation bankruptcies end in 
liquidation.  Whereas roughly 95% of the largest, publicly held firms 
reorganize in Chapter 11, the number is closer to 10% for closely 
held firms (Jordan et al, 1999). For many of these firms, the principal 
  73lender ultimately is the one who determines whether there will be a 
reorganization, so the debtor’s control turns out to be more 
circumscribed than might appear to be the case.
136 Moreover, in 
recent years, Congress has begun to rein in the Chapter 11 process as 
it applies to closely held firms.
137 
What about the trend toward more manager-driven close corporation 
provisions in the U.K.? Once again, there is less to this apparent 
trend than meets the eye. Although the debtor-in-possession 
provisions are explicitly limited to close corporations, they were not 
really enacted with close corporations in mind. The policy thinking 
behind the decision to apply the provisions to close corporations was 
that this would provide a ‘road test’ for the debtor-in-possession 
approach which, if successful, might then be rolled out to large firms 
as well. This history suggests that it would be a mistake to read too 
much into the recent adoption of a U.S.-style debtor-in-possession 
approach for small debtors in the U.K. 
In fact, we suspect that close corporation bankruptcy in both nations 
is more likely to converge toward the traditional U.K. approach than 
toward a truly manager-driven process. Based on capital structure 
considerations alone—that is, the fact that both stock and debt are 
concentrated in closely held firms—the evolutionary theory would 
predict a manager-displacing bankruptcy regime. As discussed 
above, the analysis is complicated by the need for the owner-
managers to retain both ownership and control rights if the firm is 
reorganized. But the vast majority of closely held firms appear to 
have little going concern value when they fail, and current Chapter 
11 fraught with problems as a mechanism for restructuring the 
minority of closely held firms that are worth preserving.
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In short, we suspect that the U.S. approach to close corporation 
bankruptcy will continue to edge in a U.K. direction. Although the 
debtor-in-possession provisions are unlikely to disappear,
139 creditor 
control makes more sense than giving wide-ranging discretion to the 
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U.S., and we doubt that U.K. lawmakers will make significant, 
additional departures from the traditional U.K. approach, which has 
long reflected the view that creditors should be the ones who decide 
how to resolve a closely held firm’s financial distress. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
The UK poses a great puzzle for each of the major new theories of 
comparative corporate governance. Mark Roe has argued that 
outsider/arm’s length governance is unlikely to develop in a social 
democracy, yet the shift in Britain from insider to outsider/arm’s 
length governance appears to have occurred during a long period of 
labour– that is, social democratic– control.  For their part, advocates 
of the “law matters” thesis predict that outsider/arm’s length 
governance can not emerge until shareholder protections are fully in 
place, yet the diffusion of share ownership in U.K. came before, not 
after U.K. lawmakers adopted important protections for minority 
shareholders. 
The evolutionary theory is not immune from the U.K. puzzle, either. 
The evolutionary theory predicts that outsider/arm’s length 
governance will be accompanied by manager-driven bankruptcy, yet 
British governance mixes diffuse stock ownership with manager-
displacing bankruptcy provisions. On closer inspection the puzzle 
partially disappears. Although the formal U.K. bankruptcy 
procedures are manager-displacing, many publicly held U.K. firms 
are reorganized through a norm-driven, out-of-bankruptcy process 
insolvency experts refer to as the London Approach. The London 
Approach is initiated by managers, and managers remain in place at 
the outset of the restructuring process. 
To more fully make sense of U.K. governance, this Article has 
reconfigured the evolutionary account to focus more explicitly on the 
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suggests that debt and equity will both tend toward diffusion in an 
outsider/arm’s length system, and toward concentration in an insider 
system. U.K. governance appears to be in a state of transition in this 
respect. Although U.K. stock is diffuse, debt finance remains quite 
concentrated. Based on the analysis of this Article, we speculate that 
U.K. debt markets are likely to become more diffuse in the future, 
and that this will lead to a more self-evidently outsider/arm’s length 
governance framework. Most importantly, we believe that British 
bankruptcy will become increasingly manager-driven as debt 
becomes too diffuse for the London Approach to continue to play the 
role it plays now. 
In the last part, the Article shifted from publicly held corporations to 
the governance of closely held firms. In this context, both U.K. and 
U.S. governance prove puzzling for the revised evolutionary theory.  
Given the characteristic concentration of both equity and debt in 
closely held firms, one would expect to find a manager-displacing 
approach to bankruptcy. Yet the U.S. has long had manager-driven 
rules for close corporation bankruptcy, and the U.K. has recently 
adopted a debtor-in-possession provision for small firms. In part, this 
puzzle can be explained as a response to the distinctive bundling of 
ownership in control and closely held firms. But the manager-
friendly appearance of the rules also is somewhat misleading. In 
contrast to the governance of publicly held firms, where the UK 
seems to be evolving in a U.S. direction, our analysis suggests that 
the trend is precisely the opposite for close corporation bankruptcy.  
In practice, U.S. close corporation has become more like the 
manager-displacing U.K. approach in recent years, and we expect 
this trend to continue. 
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“crystallize”, which results in the charge becoming a fixed 
charge against property covered by the security agreement.  On 
when crystallization occurs and related issues, see Goode 
(1995: 736-41).  
 
62   On the powers of an administrative receiver, see Goode (1997: 
234-37).  On the possibility of a receiver organising a corporate 
rescue, see Fletcher (1996: 420).  
 
63    A court cannot refuse to make a winding up order on the 
grounds that the company’s assets have been mortgaged up to 
the hilt:  Insolvency Act 1986, s 125(1); Goode (1997: 106 n 
42).    
64    Re Northern Garage Ltd [1946] 1 Ch 188; Sowman v David 
Samuel Trust Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 616; Re Potters Oils Ltd 
[1986] 1 WLR 201. 
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65   On the outcome in the unlikely event of a surplus, see Goode 
(1997: 263-64).  
 
66   Companies Act 1985, ss 652, 652A. It is a precondition of such 
removal that the company’s creditors be informed and do not 
object. Where there are no assets, then there is no reason to 
object. Furthermore, no one will be willing to act as liquidator 
with no assets to pay them.    
  
67   A supervening winding-up order would, however, result in the 
automatic removal of the company’s directors.  See above note 
49 and accompanying text. 
 
68    An exception to this could be where the managers, acting 
through a new corporate vehicle, buy the assets from the 
receiver and then go back into business.  On the regulation of 
this sort of practice, which could cause considerable 
dissatisfaction on the part of unpaid unsecured creditors of the 
original company, see Fletcher (1996: 489, 664-67). 
 
69   On the absence of major legislative initiatives until this point in 
time, see Fletcher (1996: 13-14).  
 
70   On the motives underlying the enactment of the legislation, see 
Carruthers and Halliday (1998: 112-123). 
71    On the transition from the Insolvency Act 1985 to the 
Insolvency Act 1986, see Fletcher (1996: 19-20).    
 
72    On why larger UK companies tend not to grant all-
encompassing security interests, see Carruthers and Halliday 
(1998, 163, 195).    
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73   See above, text to notes 53-62; Insolvency Act 1986, s 29(2) 
(definition of “administrative receiver” as receiver appointed by 
creditor with security encompassing the whole, or substantially 
the whole, of the debtor company’s property).  
 
74    Insolvency Act 1986, s 9(1).  Note that a creditor whose 
security covers all, or substantially all, of the debtor’s assets 
can oppose to the making of an administration order, but there 
is no such creditor in the scenario we are considering at present.  
On this potential veto, see ibid. ss 9, 10 (discussing a creditor 
entitled to appoint an “administrative receiver”). 
 
75   Insolvency Act 1986, s 8(3).  
 
76  The chances of success will be high:  Rajak (1994: 204, Table 
8.4).  
 
77   Insolvency Act 1986, s 11(3).  For instance, there will be an 
absolute bar on the appointment of an administrative receiver 
and a winding up petition cannot be brought.     
 
78   11 U.S.C. § 362. 
 
79   Insolvency Act 1986, ss 13, 388, 389. 
 
80   Ibid, ss 14(1), 17, sch. 1.   
 
81   Ibid, s 14(4). 
 
82   Ibid, s 14(2)(a). 
 
83    For background on the development of the legislation, see 
Carruthers and Halliday (1998: 269-83).  
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84   See Insolvency Act 1985, s 45.   
 
85    The grounds for disqualification were expanded under the 
Insolvency Act 1985.   
 
86   Insolvency Act 1986, ss 214(2), (3).  On when a director “ought 
to know” that a company will not avoid insolvent liquidation, 
see s 214(4).  
   
87   Ibid, s 214(1).  In practice, applications for wrongful trading 
declarations are rare.  On why this is the case, see Cheffins 
(1997: 545-46).    
 
88   Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s 10. 
 
89   Ibid, ss 6-9.  On the practical importance of this ground for 
disqualification, see Farrar and Hannigan (1998: 345, 348) 
  
90   Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] BCLC 325, 330, 
337;  Re Linvale Ltd [1993] BCLC 654; Re Hitco 2000 Ltd 
[1995] 2 BCLC 63; Re Continental Assurance Co. of London 
plc [1997] 1 BCLC 48; Re Barings plc [2000] 1 BCLC 523.    
 
91   Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s 6.  
 
92    The recommendations were based on primarily on a prior 
study:  Insolvency Service (2000a). See also the earlier 
consultation document: Insolvency Service (1999).   
 
93    A shake-up of the personal bankruptcy regime was also 
proposed, with the declared objective being to allow 
entrepreneurs who have become bankrupt through “bad luck” 
rather than their “fault” to enjoy a speeded-up discharge: DTI 
(2001: 1-8). See also the earlier consultation document on 
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personal insolvency: Insolvency Service (2000b).  The change, 
it is hoped, will encourage entrepreneurship.  Nevertheless, 
reform will not offer much for managers of publicly quoted 
companies.  This is because they are unlikely to be asked to 
give personal guarantees of business debts and thus are not at 
risk of personal bankruptcy if the firm fails.  
 
94   Insolvency Act 2000, s 1 and Sch 1.  A “small” company is 
defined by section 247 of the Companies Act 1985 as one 
which satisfies two or more of the following three criteria: (i) 
its annual turnover is not greater that £2.8m; (ii) its balance 
sheet total is not more than £1.4m; and (iii) it does not employ 
more than 50 persons.  
 
95   The new proposal builds on a different existing mechanism to 
the new DIP procedure introduced by the Insolvency Act 2000 
(above note 94 and text thereto).  The Insolvency Act 2000 
extends the CVA mechanism, which is located in the 
Insolvency Act 1986. The new proposal seeks to develop a 
similar “cram-down” mechanism known as the “scheme of 
arrangement”. It is thought of as preferable as a means of 
securing a reorganization for large firms because it binds 
creditors who are “unknown” at the time of the vote and who 
therefore have not been informed. The Committee conducting 
the Review of Business Rescue Mechanisms considered that 
the Insolvency Service should liaise with the ongoing Review 
of Company Law over the desirability of this proposal, 
apparently because the schemes of arrangement provisions are 
located in Part XIII of the Companies Act 1985, as opposed to 
the Insolvency Act 1986 (Insolvency Service, 2001). 
 
96   See also Holland (1998: 27); Davies (2001: 12-13).    
 
  88 
97   See generally section III above, as well as Black (1998: 461) 
(expressing doubts, however, on the importance of law); Coffee 
(1994: 877-82).    
 
98   See, e.g., Stapledon (1996: 231, 253, 279), questioning whether 
the Berle-Means corporation is dominant in the UK but 
concluding that the ultimate controllers of UK companies are 
arm’s-length shareholders.    
 
99   On this trend, see also Parkinson (2000); Pye (2001).    
 
100    For more on the institutional investment “culture”, see 
Clements (1995).  For further background on why UK 
institutional investors are reluctant to intervene, see Short and 
Keasey (1997: 26-38); Parkinson (2000: 239-40).    
 
101   On the terminology, see Adams (1989: 67-68).  
 
102    Loan capital was, however, an important source of finance 
during the 1960s.  On why the situation changed, see Bank of 
England (1981).    
 
103    One consideration might be that British companies are less 
highly leveraged than those in America (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995: 1428-1430, 1438), but the difference seems small 
compared to the disparity in corporate bankruptcy rates.  
   
104    This is also the case with company voluntary arrangements, 
another potential rescue alternative available under the 
Insolvency Act 1986.  See Goode (1997: 335).    
 
105    The study was based primarily on interviews with lawyers, 
bankers and accountants who specialised in debt restructuring 
work in London during the 1990s to build up a picture of what 
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was involved.  This was backed up, wherever possible, by 
reference to other empirical studies and to descriptions in the 
practitioner literature. 
106    Above, text to notes 72ff. Even more so than in earlier 
examples, it should be borne in mind that actual practice in any 
given instance may vary widely from the highly stylised facts 
set out in the text. 
107    This paragraph and the next draw on Armour and Deakin 
(2001: 34-35). 
108    Often a subsection of the firm’s business will not be 
economically viable. However, it is usually possible to 
liquidate the relevant assets or subsidiary company without 
putting the rest of the group into insolvency proceedings. 
109   In larger cases, the role of lead bank will be shared amongst a 
“steering committee” composed of several banks drawn from a 
range of constituencies. 
110    The terminology is drawn from that used in arranging 
syndicated loans. Syndicated bank loans are usually structured 
so that initial negotiations with the debtor are carried out with 
only one bank, which then solicits participations from other 
banks in the marketplace. The institution performing this 
function is referred to as the ‘lead’ bank (see Wood, 1995).  
111   Various explanations for participants’ adherence to the London 
Approach norms are considered in Armour and Deakin (2001: 
40-46).  Also important is the implicit threat of regulatory 
sanctions by the Bank of England (although this has ceased to 
be so credible since the removal in 1998 of the Bank’s 
responsibility for the prudential regulation of banks).  
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112   This might be the case, for example, where a minor participant 
in a syndicated loan is also a major secured lender to a 
particular trading subsidiary. Adherence to the standstill will 
mean the creditor cannot enforce its security, which will restrict 
its ability to realise the optimum value for its collateral.  
113   An administrative receivership is unlikely to occur, as publicly 
quoted companies rarely grant floating charges.  See above, 
note 72. 
114   It is difficult to quantify the extent of the so-called ‘indirect’ 
costs of bankruptcy. For evidence drawn from one case study 
suggesting they are of a very high order of magnitude, see 
Cutler and Summers (1988). See also Chen and Merville 
(1999). 
115   Companies in Chapter 11 are, to some extent, also dependent 
on creditor goodwill, in particular for obtaining fresh financing. 
116   In a London Approach workout, old equity may retain up to 
15% of the firm’s value (Armour and Deakin, 2001: 36). 
 
117    La  Porta  et al (1997) arguably take debt into account most 
fully, as they consider creditor rights and several measures of 
debt levels in their analysis of the legal determinants of external 
finance.  As noted, above note 31, their findings do not shed 
light on the analysis of this Article. 
 
118    As discussed in Part III above, controlling shareholders may 
also expropriate value from minority shareholders through 
private benefits of control. 
 
119    We should emphasize that the diffusion is relative.  Even in the 
U.S., holdings of publicly issued debt tend to be more 
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concentrated than stock. See Kahan (1995: 583-86), noting that 
institutional investors hold most corporate bonds. 
 
120  This is because the principal risk—often referred to as an 
overinvestment problem—is that shareholders will take risks 
that provide a possible benefit to shareholders but whose 
downside will be borne partially or completely by debtholders.  
If the firm will remain solvent in both the good and bad states 
of the world, shareholders the overinvestment problem 
disappears, since shareholders bear the costs of their decision 
making. 
 
121    The source of these limitations in the US is the Trust Indenture 
Act of 1939.  But British law does not hamstring trustees in the 
same way, and it is possible to imagine trustees who would 
play a far more active role even in U.S. debt governance than 
the passive existing trustees.  The “supertrustee” proposed by 
Amihud et al (1999) is just such an imagining. The obvious 
downside of an active trustee is that vigorous monitoring is 
more costly than passive investment.  We discuss the tradeoff 
between the benefits of reducing financial agency costs and the 
costs of monitoring below. 
 
122     Interestingly, LBOs may be the exception that proves the rule 
in some respects.  The LBOs of the 1980s proved to be a 
transitional state.  Despite the predictions of some prominent 
commentators (e.g. Jensen, 1989: 61), most were taken public 
again within a few years.  Moreover, LBOs often included a 
significant amount of (concentrated) bank finance along with 
the junk bond financing. 
 
123     The rise of the commercial paper market in the United States in 
the 1960s and 1970s was an illustration of this phenomenon.  
Unable to compete with traditional bank loans, banks lobbied 
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for changes to the banking laws that would enable them to enter 
the commercial paper market (Litt et al, 1990). 
 
124  Diffuse stock and diffuse debt may go in tandem for other 
reasons as well.  Markets for publicly issued, unsecured debt 
may, for instance, provide valuable information to scattered 
shareholders about the prospects of the firm (Adler, 1993).   
 
125     In the U.S., investment bankers who cut their teeth selling U.S. 
war bonds to the American public played a central role in 
developing a market for railroad bonds thereafter.  The 
railroads, which were the first major U.S. corporations, first 
raised capital through the bond markets and only later began to 
raise significant amounts of capital from the equity markets 
(Coffee, 2001: 26-27; Skeel, 2001: 48-52). 
 
126       In the United States, as has often been noted, J.P. Morgan 
solved this problem by developing a reputation for protecting 
the European investors who were a crucial source of financing 
for the American railroads.  By the early 1900s, J.P. Morgan 
and its peers held both stock and debt interests in numerous 
American corporations (DeLong, 1991). 
 
127   The increasing number of banks that participate in syndicated 
loans can also be seen as consistent with this prediction.  Large 
syndicates are a partial substitute for public debt, though they 
are likely to remain more costly and entail more oversight than 
a true public issue. 
 
128    Even if bondholders were represented by a trustee, the need to 
obtain bondholders approval for any significant restructuring 
would complicate the parties’ ability to maintain the level of 
secrecy that current characterizes the London Approach. 
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129       In the United States, investment banks began to include 
precisely these kinds of provisions in bond indentures in the 
1930s, but voting provisions were subsequently prohibited by 
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.  The voting prohibition has 
significantly complicated out-of-bankruptcy workouts in the 
U.S.  Although firms with publicly issued debt do restructure 
through out-of-bankruptcy solicitations, the right of dissenters 
to insist on full payment makes restructuring impractical unless 
nearly all of the bondholders consent.  The classic discussion is 
Roe (1987).  
130   The pressure from managers is likely to come in actual cases, 
rather than through the legislative process.  Historically, 
managers have not been major lobbyists on bankruptcy issues 
even in the manager-friendly U.S. context. Skeel (2001: 81-82) 
explains that managers tend not expect their firm to wind up in 
bankruptcy and therefore do not focus on bankruptcy issues.  
Creditors, on the other hand, figure prominently in the 
legislative process, as well as in actual cases.  For similar 
conclusions about the most recent US and UK reforms, see 
Carruthers and Halliday (1998).  
131  There is no single, accepted definition of a closely held 
corporation.   Existing definitions tend to focus on the number 
of shareholders: for example, the American Law Institute’s 
(1994) Principles of Corporate Governance define a ‘close 
corporation’ as one with a small number of shareholders and no 
active trading market for its shares. 
 
132    A small company is defined as satisfying two or more of the 
following three criteria: (i) its annual turnover is not greater 
that £2.8m; (ii) its balance sheet total is not more than £1.4m; 
and (iii) it does not employ more than 50 persons (above, note 
94). 
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133    Another imminent reform is a shake-up of the personal 
bankruptcy regime to allow entrepreneurs who have become 
bankrupt through ‘bad luck’ rather than their ‘fault’ to enjoy a 
speeded up discharge (DTI, 2001).  The relationship between 
entrepreneurship and close corporation insolvency is discussed 
below. 
134  Although Congress has added a number of “small debtor” 
specific provisions in recent years, as we discussed below, 
Chapter 11 is available to all corporate debtors, without 
reference to size or ownership composition.  See 11 U.S.C.   
109. 
135    For a model showing that, under some conditions, a lender may 
not have an incentive to renegotiate to an efficient allocation of 
control and ownership rights to the entrepreneur, see Ayotte 
(2001).  To the extent creditors do not have appropriate 
incentives, the best solution may be to couple creditor control 
with a pre-determined carve-out for the owner-entrepreneur.   
136    The principal lender often has a security interest in all of the 
debtor’s significant assets, and it frequently has a large 
unsecured deficiency claim as well.  The classification of the 
deficiency claim has been one of the most controversial issues 
involving close corporation debtors, in large part because it 
often determines whether the lender has complete veto power 
over any proposed reorganization plan.  Some courts have 
forbidden debtors from classifying deficiency claims separately 
to increase the likelihood of confirming a reorganization plan—
see, e.g., Matter of Greystone Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274 (5
th 
Cir. 1991)—while at least one has gone so far as to require 
separate classification: Matter of Woodbrook Associates, 19 
F.3d 312 (7
th Cir. 1994). 
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137    See e.g., 11 U.S.C. section 362(d)(3) (limiting the automatic 
stay in “single asset real estate” cases).  The proposed 
legislation that passed both the House and Senate in 2001 
would have limited the exclusivity period to 100 days for small 
business debtors. 
138    The most obvious problem is that closely held companies are 
unlikely to be reorganized unless the shareholder retain their 
interest, yet Chapter 11 requires adherence to the absolute 
priority rule (which eliminates shareholders’ interest) in order 
to confirm a “cramdown” plan over the objections of a 
dissenting class.  Debtors have tried to resolve this tension by 
proposing to contribute new value. .  For an analysis of the new 
value issue, in the context of the Supreme Court’s most recent 
attempt to resolve it, see Baird and Rasmussen (1999). 
139       For a discussion of the political factors that are likely to 
preserve the general status quo, see Skeel (2001: 233-35). 
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